The Politics of the United Nations and the Reality of Responsibility to Protect: The Case Study in Libyan Crisis Wisdom Iyekekpolo* Professor O.J. Offiong

International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.14, 2013 22 The Politics of the United Nations and the Reality of Responsibility to Protect: The Case Study in Libyan Crisis Wisdom Iyekekpolo* Professor O.J. Offiong Department of Political Science, University of Benin, Edo State Nigeria. *E-mail of the corresponding author: eyewyz@yahoo.com Abstract There has been intense debate on the appropriateness of interventions in sovereign states. This has resulted in a divide which has pitched those in favour against those against intervention. In a concerted effort to resolve the differences and enhance the protection of civilian populations in times of conflict, the World leaders in 2005 adopted the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which seeks to reconceptualise/redefine intervention and sovereignty as that of responsibility or duty to defend a population. The first resort to R2P by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was in its resolution 1973 which was aimed at protecting the civilian population caught-up in the violence that erupted in Libya in 2011. The UNSC resolution 1973 and its implementation in the 2011 Libyan crisis has been a test case for the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. It is therefore important to use it as a case study in determining if humanitarian intervention in sovereign state is possible without undermining the sovereignty of the state; the possibility of intervening state(s) using R2P as a platform to promote self-interest; and finally, the continued perpetuation of unprecedented human right abuses, war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity under the covering of sovereignty. The research examines recent NATO led intervention in Libya with a view of ascertaining its intent and appropriateness, traces the origin and pillars of R2P then, further examines its implementation in the 2011 Libyan crisis with the objectives of determining its appropriateness and its level of success if indeed it was successful. Finally, the research examines if politics in the Security Council enhances or impedes the implementation of R2P and what the future holds for the doctrine. The work in its propositions assumed that the members of the UNSC advance their national interest in implementing R2P and that the UNSC’s prompt intervention in Libya was driven by a regime change agenda. The methodology adopted in gathering and analysing data in this work is the historical methodology and the secondary sources of data collection were employed. In conclusion, this work supports the recourse to the doctrine of Responsibility to protect in the 2011 Libyan crisis as it adjudges it appropriate. It also adopts as necessary the NATO’s rise to the challenge of implementing the Security Council Resolution 1973. The work argues that the intervention in Libya was a success as the protection of the civilian population from impeding mass slaughter in the hands of the Ghaddafi-led regime was averted. The research also submits that the United Nations Security Council did not engage in the form of politics that could have endangered the continued relevance of the doctrine of R2P. In its final recommendations, this research advises that R2P as was approved in 2005 is appropriate though with a little fine-tuning in the basic strategy of military engagement in conflict area. It urges the International community to ensure its continued existence and relevance therefore the adoption and implementation of the Responsibility to Protect must be devoid of all forms of United Nations politics. The protection of civilian population in any crisis must be done primarily with humanitarian interest in focus. Keywords: Responsibility to Protect, United Nations, Libya, Humanitarian Intervention 1. Introduction The United Nations came about primarily to maintain and check threats to international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945:1) after the sorrow and anguish of World War II. Its creation was a deliberate attempt to ensure that World War II was the end of total war. The United Nations charter further provides procedures to handle any international dispute or friction to check its escalation. This is contained in Chapters VI and VII of the charter. The UN charter further upholds the sovereignty of all its member state in article 2 No 7 by asserting that International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.14, 2013 23 nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state but in the case of threat to international peace, articles 41 and 42 permits the United Nations Security Council to take measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. Despite these provisions, the post cold-war era witnessed unprecedented mass slaughter and atrocities in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and other affected countries. While the UN charter concentrated on inter-state conflicts, the 1990s witnessed brutal intra-state conflicts. So Political scientists and Legal theorists began to discuss humanitarian intervention as necessity in the face of intrastate violence (Auger 2011:85). The crisis, war and intervention in Kosovo and East Timor heightened the debate on humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. While the debate on intervention and sovereignty continued, the then UN Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan raised fundamental questions on existing norms based on sovereignty and non-intervention. Referring to the precedents of Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor; he asserted that each has either shown the consequence of inaction or lack of unity of the international community in the face mass murder (Auger 2011:86). The Canadian governments in response to this call by the UN Secretary-General provided the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report on the doctrine or principle of Responsibility to Protect. The ICISS led by Gareth Evans attempted to change the dynamics of the debate by reframing the issue not as a Right to intervene but as a Responsibility to Protect. This doctrine of responsibility to protect was approved at the World Summit of 2005. The doctrine rest on 3 pillars: Firstly, it is the primary responsibility of states to protect their own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity; Secondly, the international community has the responsibility to assist the state in meeting those responsibilities; Thirdly, the international community has a responsibility to take timely and decisive actions in cases were a state has manifestly failed to protect its own population from these crimes (Court 2011:6). The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was invoked by the UNSC on March 17 by the adoption of Resolution 1973 which “authorizes member states ... to take all necessary measures, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya...” (Blanchand, 2011:13). The application of R2P in Libya has been one of the few implemented cases since 2005. 2. Objective of the study This study basically intends to review the emergence of R2P and its implementation in the Libyan 2011 crisis. In the course of the review, the paper will 1. examine if the implementation of R2P in Libya was appropriate; 2. examine if the NATO-led intervention in Libya was appropriate; 3. determine if the implementation of the responsibility to protect (R2P) in Libya was done as required, specified and in accordance with the principle/doctrine as approved by the UNSC resolution 1973; 4. to establish if R2P implementation in Libya was successful or not; 5. to find out if the politics in the UNSC and the UN in general enhances or impedes the implementation of R2P; and lastly, 6. to ascertain the present state of R2P, predict its future and suggest way forward for the doctrine. 3. The emergence of the doctrine of R2P The 1990s saw an increase in the calls for the international community to provide for and protect populations displaced in the own countries. The views of the likes of Javier Perez de Cuellar, Francis M. Deng, Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, Kofi Annan, and others helped to point out the limitations of Sovereignty in International law, its consequences on the rights of a population and the need for humanitarian intervention in cases of massive human right violations. The issue of humanitarian intervention became a key one in international relations, but its implementation was very difficult as the early post cold war era saw a UNSC that was reluctant to issue any resolution that will be deemed as a violation of State sovereignty (Murithi 2007:15). In the face of UNSC reluctance to authorize humanitarian interventions, the former Secretary-General of UN, Kofi Annan made compelling appeals in the 1999 UN General Assembly and the 2000 millennium summit, for the International community to reach a consensus on resolving the dilemma of humanitarian intervention (Amneus 2008:12). In response, the Canadian government, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September 2000 (Amneus 2008:13). The ICISS was co-chaired by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.14, 2013 24 Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, a UN diplomat. Financing was done by Canada and the Carnegie and McArthur Foundations. The mandate of the ICISS was basically to look into the legal, moral, operational and political debate on humanitarian intervention (Amneus 2008:13). After several discussions, meetings and consultations around the world, the ICISS released a report titled The Responsibility to Protect in December 2001 (Madokoro 2011:5). The report attempted to proffer an answer to the fundamental questions posed by Kofi Annan in 1999 and 2000 thus, “if humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” (http://www.un.org/bgresponsibility.shtml). Bogliolo (2009:22) in his essay ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the legality of using force’ writes that the commission’s main achievement was the re-conceptualization of Sovereignty as implying Responsibility. The ICISS attempted to cause a change in perspective and language of humanitarian intervention from right to intervene to responsibility to protect; therefore dousing the tension and debate that had engulfed it. After initial delay, world leaders unanimously adopted R2P at the 2005 World Summit (Madokoro 2012:5), with a further reaffirmation by the UNSC Resolution 1674 in 2006 (Teitt 2008:3). 4. Literature review In a research of this nature, it is imperative that a proper review of related literature be done. On this basis, two different scholarly perspectives of the doctrine of Responsible to protect will be reviewed then a further review of literature on scholarly essays on Humanitarian Military Intervention in Libya. 5. Responsibility to Protect Literature on the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect has been basically focused in two main issues which are State sovereignty and Humanitarian intervention. There is an intense controversy and correspondingly, a large body of literature about whether (and if so, when) humanitarian intervention is legal and/or legitimate under international law provision (Sarbu 2009:8). This debate is predicated on State sovereignty which is often traced back to the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Sovereignty guarantees a States territorial integrity, border inviolability and the supremacy of the state (http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sovereignty). This is reemphasized in the United Nations charter, article 2, # 7. The debate has those who believe that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in the internal affairs of a State in conflict to avoid escalation and maintain international place but on the other side of the debate are those who hold strongly to the Treaty of Westphalia guaranteed State sovereignty. In the presentation of this debate, attempt will be made to fit the perspectives into the two dominant International Relations schools of thought. These are the Realist and the Idealist schools of thought. 6. Realist perspective The realists postulate that power is the basis of international relations and that State only act in national interest. On this basis the realists argue against intervention that is only justified for humanitarian purpose. The international system is portrayed as a brutal Arena where States look for opportunities to take advantage of each other and therefore States are suspicious of each other. States are in constant struggle for power where each State strives not only to be the most powerful actor in the system but also to ensure that no other State achieves that of position (Mearsheimer 2006:571). Realists recognize that States sometimes operate through institutions (Mearsheimer 2006:572); however they believe that rules governing humanitarian interaction and doctrine like the responsibility to protect are designed in self interest either to maintain or increase its power. The Realists assumptions denotes therefore that intervention in sovereign state is never entirely humanitarian but in the self interest of the intervening state in an attempt to either maintain or increase their power and sphere of influence. They see the responsibility to protect as a justification used as a cover for selfish national interest of powerful States in seeking to maintain or increase their power base. Macfarlane et al in their 2004 work The Responsibility to Protect: Is anyone interested in Humanitarian intervention? It attempted to categorize the realist’s opposition to humanitarian intervention into four groups. Firstly, those who argue that the responsibility to protect has the potential to divide the world into civilized and uncivilized zones and promote a return to semicolonial practices in the latter. Secondly, those who are uncomfortable with the case-by-case decision making procedure. They argue that this raises the matter of selectivity and arbitrary application, which affects legitimacy. They further view the UNSCs jurisdiction of where to and not to intervene as a conspiracy by an elite group of Western powers to sit in judgment of their own actions. Thirdly are those who propose a return to the good old days - when the International Committee of the Red Cross formed the highest level of intervention. The International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.14, 2013 25 fourth group is the refugee and advocacy organizations that envisage self interest and politically guided interpretation of responsibility to protect in its application to the rights of refugees. Realists argue that any intervention even when coated with humanitarianism directly breaches the UN charter and could lead to abuse. This is based on the realist assumption that all States even an intervening States(s) only pursue its national interest (Guraziu 2008:4). Lan Brownlie argues that humanitarian intervention, on the bases of all available definitions, would be an instrument wide open to abuse a rule allowing humanitarian intervention is a general license to vigilantes and opportunists to resort to hegemonial intervention (lan Brownlie Quoted in Rudi Guraziu 2008:4). In the same vein, Bellamy and Wheeler (2005:560) in their essay Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics highlights some of the realist views. These are that States almost always have mixed motives for intervening and are rarely prepared to sacrifice their own soldiers overseas unless they have self interested reasons for doing so. Realists therefore believe that humanitarian intervention cannot be free from the national interest of the intervening State(s). They further argue that States should not shed the blood of their citizens for foreigner in crisis on moral ground. Bellamy and Wheeler (2005:561) further points out that the national interest that guides States behaviour according to realism without doubt cause selective responses to humanitarian intervention as States will only intervene in crises that they have interest. Also, humanitarian intervention is prone to abuse as intervening States only use it as a means of achieving their national self-interest. 7. Idealist Perspective Idealists argue that it is important and a moral duty for State(s) to intervene in another State with the aim of protecting civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing war crime and crime against humanity. They argue that State sovereignty bestows on a State the responsibility to protect its citizen and in the event of a State’s failure with regard to this responsibility, it then losses its sovereign right (Bellamy & Wheeler, 2005:558). Sarbu (2009:20) writes that it seems utterly simplistic and unjust to reduce humanitarian operations to a function of national interests, security concerns and material capabilities Sarbu in developing this Idealistic perspective emphasizes two points which are the Moral consideration and Economic interdependence. Under the moral consideration, it is argued that the United Nations humanitarian intervention will occur out of the intrinsic will of United Nations democratic members to address different forms of global disorder, remove human rights violations, atrocities and large scale suffering all across the world (Sarbu 2009:22). Some of the likely triggers for this moral consideration include the media or the so called CNN effect and membership of the same International organization. Under the Economic interdependence it is argued that in explaining the occurrence of UN humanitarian intervention, not only political institutional and moral considerations can take prevalence over security, military or strategic interests, but also economic reasons (Sarbu 2009:23). The main assumption here is that States with significant economic relations are more likely to assist each other in times of internal conflict, i.e. the economic interest of a State can prompt it to intervene in another. This is more like an interest driven intervention which is the realist position. Idealists uphold what they refer to as natural law which is proper behaviour known by reason and it is binding on all rational beings. The most important of this natural law is the natural right which accrues to all human merely by being humans. Natural law recognizes the right of sovereigns to use force to uphold the good of the human community, particularly in cases were unjust injury is inflicted on innocents (Seybolt 2007:8). This holds therefore that humans have the responsibility to assist other human who are being treated unjustly. This is so because they are also humans. The idea of natural law persisted as the basis for reasoning on the legitimate use of force (Just war) until the treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which brought the thirty years war to an end (Seybolt 2007:8). Idealist argue that sovereignty is not absolute and intervention is permitted for the purpose of preventing mass atrocities, murders and ethnic cleansing and its likes whether inter-state or intra-state. Writers like Michael Walzer have argued that human right is more important than sovereignty. He writes that humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of success) to acts that shock the moral conscience of mankind (adopted from Seybolt 2007:12). 8. Humanitarian military intervention in Libya Political scientists and other scholars alike have shown great interest in the application of force in the Libyan humanitarian intervention. Their views have not totally shifted from the age long debate dividing scholars into the Interventionist group and the Non-interventionist group. While the Interventionists view the NATO intervention in Libya as necessary to protect the Libyan civilian population and to further prove that the international community can say never again Holocausts, Cambodias, and Rwandas; not just as rhetorical level but realistically and practically implement measures put in place to check mass atrocities. The NonInternational Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.14, 2013 26 interventionists oppose the NATO intervention in Libya. They condemn it as the Trojan Horse of Western neoimperialism (Weiss 2011:5). They see the intervention in Libya variously as implementing regime change, sending messages to Iran, bombing for democracy, keeping oil prices low or pursuing other self-interest. 9. Interventionist Weiss (2011) in his work R to P Alive and Well after Libya shows enough support for NATO intervention in Libya. He believes that after the diplomatic work has been done there is an equally important role for the military which is basically what diplomats cannot do. He obviously draws inspiration from the Clausewitzian believe that war is the continuation of politics by other means. He writes that the shibboleth of Western imperialism is a distraction when there are foundations across the global South on which to build a case for robust humanitarian action; in this regards, the support of the Arab League and the African Union for outside intervention in Libya is noteworthy and perhaps a harbinger the Responsibility to Protect requires that diplomats succeed in securing agreement either on preventive measures or on the deployment of military force. In the latter case, diplomats stand aside after they succeeded, and soldiers do what diplomats cannot halt mass atrocities (Weiss 2011:5). Frost and Rodin (2011:1) argues that critics of the Libya operation often lump it together with the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions as liberal interventionism He argues that it is different from them as those interventions were explicitly aimed at regime change but the Libyan operation was guided and limited by the UN Security Council to the single goal of civilian protection (Frost & Rodin 2011:1). Qutait (2011) in her essay The Price of the Divide on Libya: Why I support the No Fly Zone. She argues that some anti-interventionists are intent on justifying their stance at all costs, to the extent of looking or minimizing the atrocities committed against Libyan citizens by the Gaddafi regime, so as to bolster arguments against the intervention (Qutait 2011:1). She further opposed the positions of anti-interventionist who accuse the West of double standards and selective intervention. She argues that the case of Libya was obviously different from other Arab countries experiencing revolution like Tunisia, Egypt etc. she argues that unlike in other Arab countries, where regimes at least made a pretence of understanding the demand for greater freedom, in Libya there was a blatant demonization of protesters as rats and cockroaches (Qutait 2011:2). In the same vein, (Thakur 2011) summarized the set of issues involved in framing international intervention in Libya into three. These are the military capacity, legal authority and political legitimacy to intervene in Libya. He argues that only the West has the requisite assets and operational capacity for military intervention in Libya (Thakur 2011:18); so the responsibility fell on the West to handle that. The legal authority was provided by the UNSC resolution while the political legitimacy was achieved with the support of the Arab League and African Union. 10. Non-interventionist Friedman (2012) in his article Intervention in Libya and Syria isn’t humanitarian or liberal submitted that Libyan intervention by NATO has delivered nothing but political chaos. He avers that advocates of intervention underestimate coercions contribution to political order. Friedman reviewed three rationales for military intervention in Libya and declared all three failures. One was to show other dictators that the international community would not tolerate the violent suppression of dissenters (Friedman 2012:1). He submits that the reversal domino theory has obviously failed to teach leaders like Bashar al-Assad of Syria anything but to brutally nip opposition movements in the bud before they coalesce, attract foreign arms and air support, and kill you or, if you’re lucky, ship you off to the Hague (Friedman 2012:1). The second rationale was to establish liberal democracy. He argues that Libya lacks the traditional building blocks of liberal democracy and that foreign military intervention impedes democratization. Thirdly, he examines the rationale of maintaining regional peace which the Libyan intervention has failed to do but instead helped in destabilizing Mali. He explains that Gaddafis fall pushed hundreds of Tuareg tribesmen that fought on his side back to their native Mali, where they promptly reignited an old insurgency (Friedman 2012:1). In the same vein, (Gardner 2011) argues that the intervention in Libya was not all together humanitarian or strictly to protect the Libyan civilian populace but a goal of regime change. Attempts to achieve this goal through international sanctions and through the backing of insurgents has represented the predominant thrust of America and European policy since 1969 after Colonel Gaddafi seized power by staging a coup d’état against King Idris (Gardner 2011:2). He argues that the International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.14, 2013 27 inability to overthrow Gaddafi through clandestine means during the Cold war resulted in attempts to co-opt him in the Post-cold war period. He concludes that the 2011 Libyan crisis provided the opportunity to overthrow the Gaddafi regime under the guise of the responsibility to protect (Gardner 2011:2) and that these Western led regime change in Libya was mainly galvanize by the US and European self interest. These interest he concludes includes the French interest in developing a stronger European security and defence umbrella over the Euro- Mediterranean and the opening of Libyan oil wealth to the US and Europe (Gardner 2011:6). Amitai Etzioni (2012) argues that intervention undermines the most elementary foundation of the international order the Westphalia norm and what he referred to as a sociological mess is left behind at the end of the intervention (Etzioni 2012:1). He further argues that the only exception to this non-intervention posture are cases in which large numbers of human beings are being killed, maimed and tortured but this intervention should not be aimed at a regime change. He believes that Libya qualified for the exception to non intervention posture but when Gaddafi offered to negotiate, the offer would have been given a chance. The rejection of this offer had passed the threshold that separates a humanitarian intervention justified under R2P from forced regime change, which are much more difficult to justify because they lead to more casualties and greater socio-political upheaval (Etzioni 2012:1). Yash Tandon believes that along with the ethical appeal of humanitarian intervention comes it pitfalls, dangers and risky side. He argues that intervention are more often than not based on realpolitik considerations and cynical manipulation of the doctrine by big powers to legitimize imperial wars and gross interference in the sovereign affairs of smaller and vulnerable nations (Tandon 2011:1). He submits that the principle of humanitarian intervention is not yet a mature principle as it is still subject to the manipulations by the big power for their interest. He advocates that genocide or violations of human rights in Africa should be handled by the African Union as these are strategic and humanitarian challenges that Africa must face by themselves (Tandon 2011:7). (Reifer 2011) in his opposition to humanitarian intervention in Libya writes that when it comes to the Western powers, for those who remember history, the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention can be easily dismissed. The track record of the West, which includes supporting brutal dictators acting against defenceless civilians in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, makes a mockery of their current claims to have humanitarian intent in Libya (Reifer 2011:2). He argues the Western military intervention in the third World is often problematic, leads to worsening of violence and brings more harm to the civilian population (Reifer 2011:2). He stressed Noam Chomsky’s conclusions that the major strategic aim of US in the Arab Middle East has always been the regions tremendous oil resources, control over which has long been a major lever of world power. This remains the great prize in the jockeying for control of the great powers in the region still (Reifer 2011:2). His arguments show that interventions by the West in the Third World countries are often driven by self-interest and hardly humanitarian. In an interview of Noam Chomsky by Stephen Shalom and Michael Albert on the Libyan crisis, he argued that NATO intervention in Libya was guided by Western interest in oil control. As much as Gaddafi gave the West access to oil but reliability and dependability of the leader is very important. This explains why the intervention was in Libya and not in other Arab countries that had the same uprising. He writes that with regard to the Middle East the primary concern has been, and remains, its incomparable energy resources. Control of these would yield substantial control of the world while control over oil is not the sole factor in Middle East policy; it provides fairly good guidelines, right now as well. In an oil-rich country, reliable dictator is granted virtual free rein Libya is a different case. Libya is rich in oil, and though the US and UK have often given quite remarkable support to its cruel dictator, right to the present; he is not reliable (http://www.zcommunications.org/noam-chomsky). 11. Responsibility to Protect and its implementation in the 2011 Libyan crisis Following the uprising in the Middle-East and the subsequent ousting of the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt, protests started around the major cities of Libya. The protests started in early February with the protesters calling for a change in the Libyan system of governance and a total overhaul of the 42 year old regime of Colonel Mummar Ghaddafi. This protest was met with stiff resistance from the government forces. The hitherto peaceful protest quickly turned into violent. With eruption of violence, series of actions were taken by the international community to quell the crisis. Responses from the international community included those of the United Nations, Regional bodies, North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), International Criminal Court (ICC). We have divided these responses into two, namely, Non-military response and the Military response. International Affairs and Global Strategy www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper) ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.14, 2013 28 12. Diplomatic response to Libyan crisis On the 20th of February, the Human Right Watch reported that the estimated death toll of 4 days of protests in Libya had reached a frightening minimum death of 233. The UNWatch also published urgent NGO appeal to the world leaders to stop atrocities in Libya. This included a list of 22 NGOs calls for a stop of violence in Libya (http://www.blog.unwatch.org/ index .php/2011/02/20/urgent-ngo-appeal-to-world-leaders-to-preventratrocities- in-libya/). The spokesman of the UN Secretary-General issued a statement on the 21st of February that the Secretary- General was outraged at press reports that the Libyan authorities have been firing at demonstrators from warplanes and helicopters and therefore warned that if confirmed; it would constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian law (UN SG/SM/13408 AFR/2119), and therefore called for an end to hostilities. The Arab League Chief, Amr Moussa led an emergency session in Latra on the 22nd of February 2011 to discuss Libya. He said violence against protesters must come to an end. The League of Arab States went ahead to suspend Libya’s participation until the violence was stopped. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the R2P issued a press release on the situation in Libya. He said that the secretariat was alarmed at the level of violence and reminded the Libyan government of its 2005 world summit pledge to protect its population by