FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF CONSOLIDATION

BY



Wisdom Iyekekpolo,
Gloria Okonye,
Helen Okonye,
Stanley Nwadiaru





A Seminar Paper presented in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria




Lecturer- Dr. D. A. Tonwe




March, 2011

ABSTRACT

Nigeria is a federal Republic made up of thirty six States. The History of Nigeria federalism dates back to the pre-independence constitution of 1954 called the Lytlleton Constitution. However, with the advent of the 1979 and 1999 constitution, there has been a profound change in the practice of federalism in the country which has called into question whether Nigeria is indeed a federation. This question has been further accentuated by recent damming report of the National intelligence council of the United States Government which forecasted that by the year 2020, Nigeria might cease to exist as a nation-state. The level of government that should take responsibility for such issues as federal character, power sharing, revenue allocation, maintenance of public order, fiscal federalism, judiciary are the major centripetal and centrifugal forces that have threatened the consolidation of the Nigeria federation. The current situation where the federal government is a towering overlord over the component states on issues enumerated above, and much to the disenchantment of the states, requires a thorough re-examination and possible redress. The bottom line is that attitude and excesses of political power elites lie central to the crises and contradiction of Nigeria federalism. In spite of this, it is maintained that, there is still hope for consolidation of the Nigeria federalism.














INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is a country of extraordinary diversity (Human Right Watch, 2005:5) and as such, one of extraordinary complexities. These complexities are a reflection of the avalanche of ethno-cultural and religious groups co-habiting the territory and the intricacies of interaction among them. While no one is certain about the extent of its religious diversity, Nigeria’s linguistic composition is estimated to be over 250. This situation is quite unique much as it creates unique problems which often tend to defy known and existing strategies. Indeed Nigeria’s adventure into pluralism of ethnic and religious diversities owes its origin to the colonial conquest, which permeated the entire continent of Africa beginning from the early 19th century.
The colonialist in their intra European struggle for the soul of Africa ended up creating entities with diversity of languages and cultures and the attendant problems which later bedeviled post colonial Africa. In the case of Nigeria, the foundation of this unfortunate malady was formally laid in 1914 when Frederick Lugard amalgamated the two separate territories of North and South. Even long after the amalgamation, the two territories were separately administered thereby creating disparities in their level of socio-political and economic development. In other words, it could be reasoned from this background that Nigeria as at 1914 had been implanted with enough seeds of discord that would mar its future political stability and consolidation.
Perhaps cognizance of the existence of several latent threats to the future political stability of the emergent nation-state, both the British colonialists and even Nigeria Nationalist were desirous of a system of government that would neutralize the potential threats and accommodate the divergent interest of the various ethno-cultural groups. This desire eventually found expression in the federal system of government. This suggests that the adoption of federalism in Nigeria as a diversity management technique was neither the exclusive desire of the British colonialists nor the nationalist’s leaders alone. Indeed, it was a mutual but tacit agreement of the parties (Muhammed, 2007).
In describing the popularity of the federal idea in the post 1945 period, (Walts, 2002) aptly captured the compromises that greeted the adoption of the federal system in many countries. In this, Nigeria is not an exception. According to (Walts, 2000:5) …The creators of the new states approaching independence found themselves faced with simultaneous conflicting demands for territorial integration and balkanization. They had to reconcile the need, on the one hand, for relatively large economic and political units…with the desire, on the other hand, to retain authority of the smaller political units with traditional allegiances representing racial, linguistic, ethnic and religious communities. In such situations, where the forces for integration and separation were at odds with each other political leaders of nationalist independence movements and colonial administrators alike found in the ‘federal solution’ a popular formula, providing a common ground for centralism and provincialism.
Going by the above discussions therefore, it could be reasoned that Nigeria’s adoption of the federal system was not as a strategy to manage problems of pre -independence period but more importantly as an enduring strategy that could help detonate a major source of threat to the future political consolidation and stability of an independent Nigeria. Given this background and against the fact that operation of the system per se started far back in 1954, what is the continue relevance of the federal idea in Nigeria? This is against the background of hiccups experience so far with the system and its attendant implications for political stability. Further to the above question: what are the sources of the present worry over adaptability of the system of Nigeria’s situation and what are the future hopes for a politically stable Nigeria through the practice of Federalism?

THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM AND ITS KEY FEATURES

It has been difficult for scholars over the years to reach a consensus as regards the definition of federalism. This problem is inherent in the fact that it is difficult to establish a proper linkage between theory and practice of federalism on the one hand and the issue of different scholars viewing federalism from different perspective, on the other hand. However the concept of federalism has attracted the attention of various scholars, hence the need to look at different definitions of scholars on federalism.
K.C. Wheare, the father of federalism as regards the legal or constitutional perspective of federalism, defined federalism as a constitutional arrangement which divides law making powers and functions of the state between two levels of government which are coordinate in status (Wheare, 1963:33). By this definition however, K.C. Wheare emphasizes the need for each level of government to have adequate resources to perform its functions without appealing to the other level of government. He went further to argue that if the component government in a federation discovers that the services given to them are two expensive for them to perform and call on the federal government for assistance, they are no longer coordinate to the federal government, but subordinate to it and when this happens, federalism cease to exist. Though this definition has been described as too legalistic and rigid, it has remained the classical definition of federalism.
In the same vein, Nwabueze stated that: Federalism is an arrangement whereby powers of government within a country are shared between a national (nationwide) government and a number of regionalized (i.e. territorially localized) governments in such a way that each exists as a government separately and independently from the others, operating directly on persons and property within its territorial area, with a will of its own and its own apparatus for the conduct of its affairs and with an authority in some matters exclusive of all others (Nwabueze, 1983:1).
Federalism also has been seen as the approach to governance that seeks to combine unity or shared rule with diversity or self rule (Kincaid, 1995). R.L. Watts defines federalism as a political system characterized by two sub-systems, one of central government and the other of state governments, in which the component government are coordinate in the sense that neither is politically subordinate to the other but interact with each other at many points both cooperatively and competitively. The main idea here is that although it is desirable that each level of government should be relatively autonomous in its sphere of competence, there is also the need for intergovernmental cooperation as well as the inevitability of competition (Ola, 1995).
C.J. Fredrich sees federalism somewhat differently (from the way K.C. Wheare see it) when he defined federalism thus: Federalism is a process by which a number of separate political communities enter into arrangements for working- out solutions, adopting joint policies and making joint decision on joint problems and conversely also the process by which a unitary political community become differentiated into a federally organized whole, i.e. as a process of federalism (Friedrich 1963). To him, institutional cooperation is an integral part of federalism as it involves a working arrangement to achieve an objective at a particular time. Hamilton sees federalism as an association of state to form a new one. Some other writers also regard federalism as a kind of decentralized government, in the sense that the central government alone possesses inherent authority but develops some power on the units as a means of facilitating the administration of the country. In some countries also, federalism is seen as regionalism, ethnicity being the distinctive feature which delineates the units (Awa, 1976).
Federalism is dynamic and should be seen as an instrument for the realization of national values and objectives and since societal values are not static but dynamic, the institutions built to realize them should also be flexible enough to adapt to the changing circumstances (Eleazu, 1977). From the above analysis, it would be safe to say that federalism exist in a situation where there is constitutional division of powers between different levels of government.
Having defined federalism, our next task is to discuss briefly the major features of federalism. One of the features of federalism is Rigid constitution. A Rigid constitution is one which is very difficult to amend or change and before it can be amended or changed, it will involve a specials or complicated process. There is also the existence of a Supreme Court (which is usually at the apex of the judicial system), which acts as an umpire in a federation in the case of any conflict between the centre and the constituent units. The Supreme Court interprets the constitution and makes pronouncement or Judgments on the constitutionality of the actions of government. A federal government has a clear demarcation and de -concentration of power to guarantee each unit or level of government its independent legitimacy in its own sphere and a constitutional guarantee of its own set of institutions, power and responsibilities (Olufemi, 2005). Thus, there is the independence of components within its own sphere of competence. Also worthy of note is the relative equality and viability of the component unit. A unit should not be bigger than the units put together as was the case in Nigeria first republic.

NIGERIA: A FEDERAL OR UNITARY STATE

There is a wide debate among scholars as to whether Nigeria is a federation or not. To many, the practice of federalism in the country deviates from the cardinal principles and attribute of the federal idea hence the quest for “true federalism”. To the protagonists of this concept, true federalism is referred to as a politico-constitutional device for power sharing in plural societies. As a framework for political management, it is suited for dealing with the twin problem of unity and diversity (Tamuno, (1998: 13), Asobie (1998:18), K. C. Wheare, Amwo and Herault (1998:6) (all cited in Onwudiwe & Suberu, eds.) see democracy and power sharing as the requisite for federalism.
To the proponents of the true federalism, federalism must guarantee the freedom, right and socio-economic welfare of people as federalism is inextricably tied up with the goals of democracy, good governance and development (Onwudiwe & Suberu (eds.) 2005:74).
For some others, the Nigeria federalism is termed as quasi federalism, they
tend to blame the military for this. As Osadolor contends “the military has played a key role in the collapse of the federal system through the imposition and strengthening of quasi federalism as a machinery of government that has been politically and economically repressive (Onwudiwe & Suberu (eds) 2005:94).
It will be important at this point to stress that different scholars have designated the Nigeria state at one time in the other as either a quasi federalism or still searching for true federalism. The point should be made clear that Nigeria is a federation. The underlying features of every federation is that it must be constitutionally arranged, power must be shared between the central and the unit and in practice, federalism as a system of governance is pragmatic, dynamic, utilitarian and evolving (Tonwe, 2008:298).
Based on these features, it would be very correct to say emphatically that the Nigeria state is a federation as we cannot use the federal arrangement of other States as a criterion for judging whether the Nigeria state is a federation or not. For no two federations are the same. The Nigeria federation is unique in its own sense. For example, one of the imperatives of federalism is that no unit has the right to secede. The exception to this rule existed in the defunct Soviet Union where the rights of secession of the units were constitutionally guaranteed. Also, the division of power varies from country to country. In some federations, exclusive legislative powers are vested in the central government, while the units exercise residual powers (e.g. United States and Nigeria); it is interesting to note that in Canada it is the other way round just like India where there are four lists different from what we have in Nigeria which has a concurrent list containing subjects on which the federal and State governments can legislate (Ola, 1995).
It is almost impossible to neatly share government powers between the two levels of government. Therefore they are bound to be overlapping which will necessitate cooperation (Ola, 1995). While we can situate the notion of duality of legal sovereignty to most federation, we cannot equate same for Nigeria. Nigeria is the first of its kinds to operate a federal structure where provision is made in the constitution for the local government as the third tier of government (see section 7(i) of the 1999 constitution) in the federation.
The logical conclusion from the foregoing is that in the world, there is no pure or ideal federal model, therefore the notion of “true federalism” or “quasi federalism” does not exist and cannot change the fact that the Nigeria state is a federation.
On a final note, since there is no ideal federalism, we can establish that the Nigeria Federation is characterized by features which are found in other federations and associated with K.C. Wheare’s formulation of federalism. Nigeria has a written and rigid constitution, a supreme court and a bi-cameral legislature. There is constitutional interpretation and judicial review. No unit is large and powerful enough to control the central government alone or dominate the other units put together. Each constituent government operates directly on the people rather than indirectly through the other tier. No unit or state has the right to secede from the federation. It is based on this in mind that we can say that the Nigeria state is a federation.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

The outline of the country was delineated by British, the erstwhile colonial master. Prior to their colonization by Britain, the ethnic groups that eventually metamorphosed into what is today known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria were not only independent of one another, but were also at different stages of economic, political, social and cultural development. The process of colonization culminated in the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates by Lord Lugard in 1914. With the introduction of the elective principle by Huge Clifford constitution of 1922, the first political party, the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) was formed in 1923 under the leadership of Herbert Macaulay who is popularly referred to as the father of Nigeria Nationalism. The three seats allocated to Lagos in the legislative council were won by the party in the election held in the year (1923). As at that point in time, the Northern and the Southern parts of the country were ruled as separate entities in spite of the amalgamation of 1914. The North was not represented in the legislative council and the legislation for that part of the country was by imperial proclamation. The policy of divide and rule went beyond the division of Southern part into the Eastern and Western units by Bernard Bourdillion in 1939 and ended with the promulgation of the Arthur Richards constitution which introduced regionalism in 1946. It was in that year that Northern and Southern sections of the country were effectively brought under the same national government.
The point has to be made that the introduction of regionalism in 1946 did not translate to the emergence of federalism. Nigeria was still a unitary state. The Unitary system was still in existence as at the time the Macpherson constitution came into being in 1951.
The adoption of Lyttleton constitution of 1954 marked the beginning of the federal form of government in Nigeria. Since 1954, Nigeria has accepted as an article of faith that the federal system of government is the best form of government for the country. This is obvious from the fact that after independence, attempts at constitution making has been premised on the fact that the issue of federal form of government was not open for debate.

THE POWER ELITE APPROACH

The Power Elite Approach tries to find a common ground between Marxism which holds Class as the basic unit of a state analysis and Liberalism-pluralism which holds the individuals or groups as the basic unit of State power analysis.
The major proponents of the Power Elite approach includes: Yilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and C. Wright Mills. The Power Elite approach rejects the rigid notion of separation between the bourgeoisie and the preliterate as well as the Marxist assumption that economic relations determine political relations. In the other hand, it rejects the pluralist notion of a diffuse structure of power which is distributed among various groups with multiple over-lapping memberships (Takamich 2001).
Mosca explains the basics of the Power Elite approach when he wrote that in all Societies… two classes of people appear – a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoy the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first (Mosca, 1939). The Power Elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and woman; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make decisions is less important than the fact that they occupy such pivotal positions. Their failure to make decision is itself an act that is often of greater consequence then the decisions they do make (Mills, 1956).
According to C. Wright Mills, the members of the Power elite membership is drawn from three areas (1) the highest political leaders including the President and a handful of key Cabinet members and close advisers; (2) major corporate owners and directors; and (3) high-ranking military officers (Mills 1956), (Dye 2002).
The Elite occupies what Mills terms the top command posts of society. These positions give their holders enormous authority over not just governmental, but financial, educational, social, civic and cultural institution as well. Their power is enhanced by the close collaboration of political, industrial, and military organizations. As a group then, this ruling triumvirate of politicians, corporate executives, and military officers has by virtue of the position they hold, an unprecedented authority to make decisions of national and international consequence (Dye, 2002). The power elite sometimes disagree but they agree more than disagree.
The power elite approach proponents argues that National interest or State policies are determine by the power elites in pursuit of its own interest and these individuals that make up these elite group have such powers by virtue of the top positions they hold in institution like the State, business corporations and military which are all important institutions in modern society (Takamich, 2001). This implies that if the powerful men are taken off the institutional positions they occupy, away from the resources they control, then they would be powerless and poor and uncelebrated for power is not of man, wealth does not center in the person of the wealthy, celebrity is not inherent in any personality. To be celebrated, to be wealthy, and to have power requires access to major institutions, for the institutional positions men occupy determine in large part their chances to have and to hold these valued experiences (Mills, 1956; www.exampleessays.com/viewpaper/81287.html).
In summary, the Power elite Approach to the study of State Power analyzes the Society on the basis of Power elites/Masses and that the Power elites determined policies while the role of the State is just to maintain the elite domination; the Masses are fragmented and impotent in determining the decisions at the top. The approach assumes a considerable degree of in- and out-flows or social mobility between the ruling elite and the ruled, which is called the “circulation of elite” (Mill, 1956; Takamich, 2001). This paper will therefore evaluate how the Power elite in Nigeria among other factors have been the clog on the wheel of federalism and the prospect of its consolidation.

ISSUES IN THE ORIGIN AND CREATION OF THE NIGERIAN FEDERATION

There are two schools of thoughts that talks about the adoption of a federal system in Nigeria. The first school of thought is made up largely of Marxist. They argue that the federal system of government in Nigeria was imposed on the country by Britain. To the proponents of this school, Nigerians did not contribute to the decision of adopting federalism in the country (Ola, 1995). To this extent Eleazu is of the view that the founding fathers of Nigerian federalism that gathered in Ibadan in 1950 did not have a clear intention of what they wanted to achieve and so they did not address core issues and questions such as:
1. What is the common interest?
2. How best can the common interest be achieved?
3. If we need federalism what do we want to achieve by it?
4. Is a federal structure the best means of achieving what we want?
5. If so, what should be the nature and form of the federal structure? (Nnamdi 2009:106).
Thus, the British colonial masters, convinced that the Nigerian delegates to the Ibadan constitutional conference were not clear in their mind as to what type of political system they wanted, designed what appear to them would work and euphemistically dubbed it a federalism with unity in diversity (Nnamdi, 2009).
The statements of some of our political elites during this period tend to throw more light to the view of the above school of thought. Alhaji Tafawa Balawa seems to have stated the position and concern of Northerners in the midst of the raging controversy and mutual distrust that characterize that era when he said that
Nigeria’s political future may only lie in federalism so far as the rate of regional progress is concerned… The regions of Nigeria as you are aware have reached different stages of development. Some of them seem to have advanced very much more than the others and they are therefore now naturally asking to be given the opportunity to make very rapid political advance. North is afraid of making this rapid and if I may call it artificial advancement at this stage…(Cited in Adiliege, 2003).
The above statement clearly indicates the northern drive towards federalism which was in conflict with the interest of the political elites of the other regions.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo also observes that Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English’, ‘Irish’ or ‘French’. The word ‘Nigeria’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not (Elaigwu, 1993:28).
Since 1914, the British government has been trying to make Nigeria into one but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite. Nigerian unity is only a British creation for the country (Adilieje, 2003:293).
The other school of thought argues that federalism was freely chosen by Nigerians. According to them, the 1950 and 1953/54 constitutional conferences preceded the adoption of a federal system of government in Nigeria and Nigerians participated actively in the deliberations that led to the adoption of the Macpherson constitution in 1951.
The argument that Nigerians participated actively in the deliberations that led to the adoption of federalism in Nigeria is not water tight. Thus a critical analysis of the views of the above schools of thought would take us to the conclusion that in as much as Nigerians participated in the London constitutional conferences of 1950, 1953, 1954 respectively, the British government played a greater role in establishing the Nigerian federation. Unlike the federal systems of United States of America and Switzerland which falls under the category of aggregative or coming together federations (which involves the classical method of federation building in which a federal state is constituted through an agreement or bargain to bring together previously sovereign entities in a new federation), as described by Suberu and Agbaje (1999), the Nigeria federation was established to hold together the diverse ethnic groups and nationalities that had been forcibly and arbitrarily incorporated into a unitary colonial state under British imperialism. John P. Mackintosh stated thus: “The Nigerian federation has always had peculiar features; the most evident being that it was not created by the coming together of separate states but was the result of the subdivision of a country which had in theory been ruled as a single unit” (Mackintosh 1962:223). This peculiar feature of the Nigerian federation (i.e. being a British creation) is a major problem of consolidation in that it lacks the integrative features associated with coming together federation but it is rather associated with the citizens owning their allegiance to their units or regions rather than to the central government.

POLITICS OF ETHNICITY

Ethnicity has been defined by Elaigwu (1994) as ethnic consciousness acted out in relations with others–individuals and groups–to maximize gains in situations of conflicting interests and claims over scarce resources (i.e. values, statuses, and /or goods).
Ethnic consciousness is not detrimental to the process of national integration in nation-state. In fact, it can be argued that it is when competing elites and politicians exploits it for their personal gains that it becomes a problem to the nation. He further argues that ethnicity is ethnic consciousness transformed into a weapon of offence or defense in a competitive process in relations with other groups over desired scarce resources; this could lead to the mobilization of ethnic bedfellows in order to maximize gains at the expense of the other competing group(s) (Elaigwu 1994:147).
Idahosa and Aghahowa arguing in the same vein argues that the members of the ruling class have become ethnic chauvinist in order to achieve economic, political and other advantages that are often competed for by different groups. Rather than work for the unity of the federation, the leaders and aspiring leaders use these elements to keep the people divided (Idahosa and Aghahowa, 1995). We argue that ethnic consciousness is not a problem to the consolidation of federalism in Nigeria but its manipulation by the elites has continued to mar our prospect of consolidating Nigeria Federalism.




MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS AND EFFECT ON THE NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

It is instructive at the level to say that the Nigeria’s federal structure has gone through series of ‘pot-holes’ that have affected the consolidation process. Military rule has no doubt affected the structure of the Nigerian federalism (Onwudiwe/Suberu, 2005:55). According to Olusola Sanu (The Guardian, 23 January 2011) ‘Nigeria’s 50 years of nationhood: looking back with Anger’. “The army ended up destroying true federalism. They imposed the one line command structure on the country and the mess they made is what we have inherited. Nigerian became a laboratory for constitutional experimentation. In the end, the parliamentary system with its checks and balances was destroyed and replace with the presidential system which in the hands of military presidents became outright dictatorship”.
In line with its command structure, Nigeria’s federal system has been over-centralized to the extent that it reflects more of a unitary arrangement than a federal one (Elaigwu, 1998:6-7). Out of the fifty-seven (57) years of federal practice, the military his been in power for twenty-nine (29) years (1966-79; 1983-99). The period of military rule allowed the military administrations in the state to exercise most of the powers assigned to the regions under the suspended democratic constitution (Nnamdi, 2009:111). There was a gradual increase in the powers and functions of the centre and a corresponding erosion of powers and functions at the state level. For example, Ayoola notes that: “….the unitary command structure of the army is the definition incompatible with the federal political system. Thus, as long as the army was in power; federalism could only have retained paper significance” (Abia, 2008).
The military is known for the disobedience of the orders and judgments of the court thereby dealing a death blow to the rule of law which is crucial to the survival of any federalism. Executive lawlessness is more prominent under the military than a civilian regime. The creation of states (except the defunct mid-west region) we created by military in contravention of due process. There is also the violation of human right with impunity by the military; there is no freedom of expression and citizens are presumed guilty before they are tried, or detained indefinitely without trial. The right of habeas corpus is totally suspended if not wiped out from existence. In addition, bills which seek to deprive citizens of their civil liberties and property are passed into law which has retroactive or retrospective effects (Idahosa/ Aghahowa, 1995).
These various issues that have hampered the Nigeria’s federal structure can be regarded as a typical example of problems that have affected the process of consolidation over-time. Though it’s possible to say that military intervention or better put as military interference in politics has been one of a mixed-blessing but that doesn’t remove the fact that in theory and practice, federalism cannot be successful with such vice that was introduced as a result of militarization.
STATE CREATION AND ITS MOTIVATIONS

The movement for the creation of more state/regions can be traced back to 1937 when Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe advocated in his book, The Political Blueprint in Nigeria’ (Azikiwe 1965), a federal system with eight constituent states based on geographical configuration. In 1947, Chief Obafemi Awolowo also published his book… ‘Path to Nigerian Freedom’ (Awolowo, 1968) in which he proposed a re-division of Nigeria into ten federating units, with ethnic, linguistic and cultural affinity as the bases of division (Ola 1995:192).
Pre-independence of Nigeria, involved a lot of movement agitating for new states: these included a Movement for the creation of Mid-West which was launched in 1951 by Chief Anthony Enahoro and in 1953, the Middle-belt Peoples Party was formed to demand a separate state. In the same year, the Action Group began a campaign for the merger of Ilorin and Kabba provinces with the Western Region. In the East, the C-O-R state movement demands a state comprising Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers provinces. There was a demand for Kanu state too. (Ola, 1995:193).
These communal pressures for new units of state and local governments in the country continued after independence which resulted in the creation of the Midwest Region in 1963 through democratic structure and later, there were further balkanizations by different military dictators from 4 Regions to 12 states, 19 states, 21 states, 30 states and finally 36 states.
In all these state creations, only one was created via democratic process, the others were through military fiat which may not necessarily be according to the yearnings and aspirations of the people who are supposed to determine when, how and where new states should be created. Idahosa and Aghahowa have argued that in a federation, states are created in order to among other things guarantee the autonomy of significant groups but the creation of states by military decrees has resulted in what they consider to be unnecessary proliferation, thereby unwittingly weakening the ability of the federating units to defend their autonomy. It is not in the interest of the federalism to reduce the states to a position of subservience and some of the states created under the military are not economically viable (Ola 1995).
Suberu and Agbaje noted that the pressure that resulted in the creation of these states was directly rooted in the struggles by the elites within those states to access those federal revenues and resources that are disseminated or devolved through the states (Suberu and Agbaje 1999).
The military elites has also explored these agitations to promote the legitimacy of their rule, strengthen the powers and status of the central government as a means of creation a unitary government under the guise of federalism (Nnamdi 2009).


FEDERAL CHARACTER PRINCIPLE

Nigeria is a country with enormous oil wealth, large population as well as great agricultural potentials. In spite of the enormous wealth and demographic advantage, Nigeria has not been able to establish the relevant socio-political and economic framework for transformation and development. Nigeria politics is still characterized by ethno-regional conflicts, secessionist threats, religious bigotry, coups and counter-coups, corruption and mismanagement (Joseph, 1991; Forrest, 1986; Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985; Ekekwe, 1986). The fear of domination of one ethnic group or section of the country by another and the national question as to who gets what and how the national cake should be shared is central to this problem.
In view of these enormous problems, the federal character principle was established in the 1979 constitution and reaffirmed in all subsequent constitutions of the federal republic of Nigeria. The essence of the federal character principle according to Agbodike (1998), is to ensure social harmony among all Nigerians and to promote the stability and national integration of the nation. He notes that national integration is a process leading to political cohesion and sentiments of loyalty toward a central political authority and institution by individuals belonging to different social groups or political units. It ensures that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies.
According to Saro-wiwa (1985:7) the formula will make for a more equal federation is which more people will owe loyalty because they see themselves represented meaningfully therein. To an extent, the formula has achieved this intention.
The federal character principle, while stressing the imperative of ethnic – balancing, invariably enthrones ethnicity and de-emphasizes nationhood. In the process too, it strengthens parochial, particularistic orientations and primodial ethnic attachments of Nigerians. These tendencies form the basis of disaffection among various groups in the country. The formula has not adequately addressed the problems of the different and unequal ethnic groups. Unfortunately, this principle has been used to accelerate the promotion of mediocre and incompetent civil servants into government. The federal character principle has been manipulated by, and channeled to serve the overall interest of the petty bourgeois ruling class. It is the members of their class who formulate and operate the principle. As carried in the Nigerian press, and noted by Agbaje (1989:17) has been mainly an elite preoccupation…under the guise of the federal character principle, the members of the bourgeois class get themselves entrenched in power and exercise control over the machinery of state. They strive to reconcile their class differences through the operation of acceptable formula for allocation, distribution and sharing of national resources and benefits among themselves. And in the course of this elite game, members of this class climb to positions, amass wealth and enrich themselves. Agbodike opined that one of the major problematic features of the federal character principle, as presently operated, is the complexity of the interests and units as represented by the north-south, state, local government, and ethnic and religious group affiliations. For example, the creation of more states and local government and the establishment of federal educational institution in every state to enhance greater representational opportunities lead to the multiplication of governmental and administrative units and facilities which becomes disturbingly expensive to the nation.
Despite the obvious militating against the functionality of the system and controversies surrounding the notion and application of federal character, Agbodike (1998) notes that, there seems to be a general acceptance of the principle as a normative expression of the equal right of all Nigeria to participate in the political, administrative and economic affairs of the country. According to Agbodike, he suggested that to make the federal character principle achieve its objectives in Nigeria that:-
- The original North-South balances should be restore as it was when states where created in 1967. There were twelve of them, six in the North and six in the South. To eliminate mutual suspicion and ill-feeling generated by this situation. Moreover, state creation exercise should be called out with caution. This is to ensure the visibility of the states and their ability to discharge the statutory and other function for the common good of all orderly development of the country.
- Effort should be made through appropriate legislation to remove the indigene syndrome engendered by the federal character principle and the discriminatory policies, laws and regulation which legalize its operation. It is an aberration of nation building and national integration to see fellow Nigerians, some of whom were born and may have lived in a place all their lives, being thrown out of jobs they are discriminated against became they are not indigenes of the area. In this vein Osaghae (1989:453) and Mark (1986) in asking the government to see that every citizen of Nigeria who settles in any part of the country is treated as an indigene of the place and endowed with residency rights as is the case in the United States of America.


REVENUE ALLOCATION AND ITS POLITICIZATION

Revenue allocation refers to the mechanism for sharing the country financial resources among the different tiers of government in the federation, with the overall objective of enhancing economic growth and development, minimizing inter-governmental tensions and promoting national unity (Danjuma 1994) Danjuma argues that the issues of revenue allocation are partly economic but largely a matter of political compromise and an issue central to this compromise is the impact of a given ‘revenue allocation structure’ on the nature of federalism. This is an important and delicate issue, since it is federalism that creates the need for revenue allocation. Some of the questions that relates to this issue includes:
(i) How much independent source of revenue should be given to a tier of government to execute its functional responsibilities? And (ii) how should the federations resources be shared? (Danjuma, 1994).
The survival and the ultimate success of any federal system depends on an acceptable distribution of resources and functions among the tiers of government so that efficiency in the use of scarce resources is encouraged while reducing inequality in the treatment of individuals and among different states (Nnamdi 2009). Mbanefo and Egwaikhide noted that the discordance between fiscal capacity of the various levels of government and their expenditure responsibilities, the non-correspondence problem, the problem of how revenues should be shared among the states and local councils are striking features of the Nigeria federal fiscal system (Cited in Nnamdi 2009:179).
The granting of internal autonomy to the Regions under the Richards constitution of 1946 and the subsequent sharing of responsibilities between the federal and regional government, provided the starting point for the revenue allocation exercise in Nigeria. There were six ad hoc revenue allocation commissions between 1946 and 1966 and in addition the various military governments issued decrees between 1967 and 1975 on the same issue.
Since 1977, there has been the emergence of more comprehensive revenue allocation efforts. All these efforts have not had the desired impact expected by Nigerians. Lupton argues that the need to maintain the strength of the federal government always in a way that limited the scope of revenue allocation to the units and limited field and amount of revenue which could be independently raised by the regions or states characterized the pre-independence fiscal commission (Lupton, 1970). In the same vein, Onwudiwe and Suberu argue that the simultaneous emergence of oil and the military in revenue allocation politics ended the general consensus that characterized the process of construction of the revenue allocation principle. Through decree No. 13 of 19790. The federal government assumed 100 percent tax power over mining, actually the sole power to collect and distribute oil revenue. It expanded the power through Decree No.9 of 1971, which gave it exclusive right to offshore oil revenue (Onwudiwe and Suberu, 2005).
Since 1946, several criteria have been used to allocate revenue among the regions/states but the most controversial has been the Derivation principle. Because of the variability in the types and quantity of material resources in the regional units, inequality in economic development is inevitable. But Awa argued that no unit should be allowed to remain too poor and too backward compared to the average standard of living of the units within the federation. It is argued that the presence of petroleum in any state is fortuitous and the revenue from rent and royalty accruing from its mining should not be monopolized by the state of origin. On the other hands it is maintained that agricultural produce which goes into the export market flows from the skill and perseverance of the people in the state of origin and the export duty accruing from it should be surrendered in full to the state of derivation. But contrary to this, there is also an argument that there is an element of the fortuitous in both the agricultural produce and petroleum as the agricultural produce is partly a function of such places being favoured by nature (Awa, 1976). Indeed, the totality of the relationships among the units must be predicated on patriotic consideration as evidenced by the spirit as essential ingredients to federalism. Each unit must be given the opportunity to develop at its own pace within the overall national framework (Idahosa and Aghahowa in Ola (ed) 1995).
It is our view that the elite have effectively hijacked the reverence allocation process in Nigeria to meet their selfish or myopic interest. On the allocation of revenue between the central government and the units, there has been all effort to ensure that the central controls the bulk, even when these allocations are finally appropriated to individual pockets of the elites controlling the central government. These elites have used their position by virtue of the institution they occupy either military or civilian to amass the wealth of the country to their families and that of their allies.
As regards the allocation among the states, the states with oil resources have argued in favour of higher percentage of allocation via derivation principle and those states without oil have supported the opposite. Our concern is whether these allocation being sought by the different camps are for the actual development of their states or for self enrichment. We argue that the issue of revenue allocation in Nigeria would have not been this pronounced if the elites do not whipped up emotion based on it but for their personal aggrandizement. A proper revenue allocation that will reflect the wishes and aspirations of Nigeria is advised in order to maintain the Nigerian federation, but it is also very important that the allocations are used primarily for the development of the country.



POWER SHARING

This is one of the problems with the Nigeria federalism. This basically ensure that certain elective offices such as that of the president, government, chairman local government council and other key elective political offices are rotated or zoned around several geo-political divisions. Zoning offers opportunity for rotational leadership. This arrangement came into being after the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election where M.K.O Abiola, the supposedly winner of the election was denied his electoral victory. The move became necessary to allay the distrust that have been created in the southerners mind, especially the west. To this end, a National constitutional conference was set up in 1994-1995 is look at how this problem of power sharing could be resolved. Rotation of political offices/zoning system was one of the solutions proffered in the draft constitution of 1999 which provide that: the office of the President shall rotate between North and South. The office of the Chairman of council shall rotate within the local government areas… No political party shall be registered under this constitution until it has reflected the provision of this section in its constitution. For this purpose, six geo-political zones were suggested or created; North East, North West, North Central, South East, South West and South South, wherein the office of the Presidency, Vice-president, Senate president, Speaker of House of Representatives and other federal political position shall rotate.
Tekena N. Tamuno has argued among other things that none of the states of the federation is completely homogeneous (i.e. without fierce sub-group differences as often revealed, in some states, during assets-sharing exercises, the definition of local government area or public-sector employment activities). At zonal level, issues like these would be more complex (Tamuno, 1991).


RECOMMENDATIONS

In this paper so far, we have tried to examine the Nigeria federal system and its basic peculiarities and inherent problems. Analysis has revealed that stability or instability of the society is a function of the extent of societal polarization and how they are managed. Federalism by virtue of its inherent value of reconciling opposing tendencies, the federal system hold’s better prospect in helping to stem a major source of political instability. Nigerian federal structure since inception has witnessed several fiscal and structural reformation as new realities emerge. Although this is not without some deficits but like in all political organization, there is no perfect policy.
The Nigerian federal structure may not have succeeded in solving all its political ills; it is nonetheless, what has kept us united together. Moreover, even non federal systems are faced with similar problems bothering on threat to its very existence. Therefore, our inability to have stability in the political system in spite of years of practicing federalism should not be taken as bankruptcy of the system. Equally, there have been attempts at explaining the current tension prevailing in the system through emphasis on structural imbalance, but we are of the view that there is the need to focus on some other cogent factors that drives this instability. As argued in the text, absence of astute political leadership, corruption and the promotion of elite interest, by the state are the major bane of federalism and its prospects of consolidation in Nigeria. It is in the light of this that this paper submits that in spite of structural deficits and some other problems, federalism still hold better prospect for political stability in Nigeria, if the factors that promote instability can be attenuated. On this basis we recommend the following:
- Attention and more efforts should be directed on how to have a national political leadership that would be able to inspire citizens to think and act federal not a leadership that is solely driven by self interest.
- Political education and enlightenment of the citizens and the need to propagate the positive virtues of federalism are essential. This would help erase negative thought and skepticism about the system. Hence, all hands should be on deck to realize the positive intents of the federal architecture.
- Government at all levels needs to promote good governance and the values of transparency and accountability. This is against the background that lack of accountability and prevalence of corrupt practices aggravates poverty and increases frustration among citizens.
- While we should learn from our colonial and military history so as not to repeat its mistakes, we must never see ourselves as victims of history; it is our responsibility to overcome the challenges posed by our history.
In concluding these recommendations, we would not fail to state clearly that nations just don’t happen by historical accident; rather they are built by exemplary men and women with vision and resolve and sustained by institutions that promote good governance and thus socio-economic development (Gambari, 2008).


CONCLUSION

This paper has focused on the Nigerian Federalism, its problems and prospects for consolidation. In our study, we have reviewed the concept of federalism and its features. We have also gone ahead to evaluate the Nigerian federalism vis a vis the definition and features of federalism. We have discussed the origin and features of the Nigeria federalism, it development, its features, problems and prospect for consolidation.
We have approached our study from the stand point of the Power-Elite theory which holds that the society is divided into two classes, the ruling majority and the minority that is ruled. It argues that state policies reflect the wishes of the minority class who are the Power-elites. They are power-elites based on the societal institutions which they head and control. These institutions are divided into three areas which are the highest political offices, directorship of the major corporations and the highest military officers.
In our analysis, we highlighted the key features of federalism which includes a written and rigid constitution, Supreme Court and a constitutional division of power between the center and the units. We analyzed this vis a vis the Nigerian federalism and came to the conclusion that the system of government operational in Nigeria is the federal system of government. The foregoing not withstanding, the Nigerian federalism is bedeviled with a lot of problems that have made consolidation very difficult. These problems discussed includes the origin and creation of the Nigerian federalism, politics of ethnicity, military intervention in politics, state creation and its motivations, the federal character principle, revenue allocation and its politicization and the issue of power sharing in Nigeria.
On the issue of origin and creation of federalism in Nigeria, one thing is sure; there was a form of guide by the British colonial masters on the choice of federalism by our founding fathers as the preferred form of government. The colonial masters as it were controlled the politics, economy and military institutions, so they were the power-elite. This form of government was in their interest. As argued in Nnamdi (2009), Nigeria was more of a ‘hold together federation’. This form of government was introduced to keep the geographical area which was made up of diverse ethnic groups and nationalities that have been forcibly and arbitrarily incorporated into a unitary colonial state under British imperialism. Mackintosh argued in the same light when he stated that the Nigerian federation has always had peculiar features, the most evident being that it was not created by the coming together of separate states but was the result of the subdivision of a country which had in theory been ruled as a single unit (Mackintosh, 1962:223). It is time for us to rise above the circumstances of the creation of Nigerian Federalism and Unite to form a strong and prosperous federation.
The politics of ethnicity has also been another clog on the wheel of consolidating the Nigeria federalism. We argue that ethnic consciousness is not a problem in itself but the manipulation of ethnic consciousness by the power elite in their struggle for the authority to allocate scare resources. The power elite approach assumes a considerable degree of in- and out-flow or social mobility between the ruling elite and the ruled which is called the “circulation of elite (Mills, 1956). In order to migrate to the class of the elite, would-be elite and their godfathers whip-up ethnic sentiments. In other cases, for the elite to retain their elite’s position, they also rely on ethnicity as a launching pad. Our Politicians must rise above politics of ethnicity to politics of ideas.
It is not implausible to aver that one of the greatest problems that have confronted the Nigeria federation is the military interference in politics. Given the nature of the military as a hierarchical and centralized institution, a large dose of military accretion would appear to have been infused into the Nigeria federal system, so much so that any casual observer would wonder and worry about the integrity and survivability of the federal structure in the face of such protracted onslaught (Awolowo-Dosunmu, 1994). In the same vein Elaigwu explains that military rule has no doubt affected the structure of Nigeria federalism. In line with its command structure, Nigeria federal system has been over-centralized to the extent that it reflects more of a Unitary arrangement than a Federal one (Elaigwu, 1998:6–7 adopted from Onwudiwe and Suberu 2005:55). We must learn from the mistake of military in politics and ensure that there is no repetition of this.
All State creations in Nigeria with the exception of the Midwestern region have been a function of the Military elite in political arena. This has also been ably assisted by the struggle by the elites within the states created to have access to the federal allocation that is shared through the state. Put simply state creation in Nigeria has been predominantly a manipulation of the combined effort of the elite in the military and the elites from the states. This creation has been to satisfy the selfish ends of the elites. To the military, it has been a means of weakening the autonomy of the state and a means of legitimizing their elongated stay in politics while for the States elites; it was to create a channel to the “national cake”. There is basically no consensus on the number of states that the country should be divided to or even the basis of state creation, whether territorially defined state or ethnically defined state, but we are of the view that if we retain our present number of States and provide a more accountable and visionary leadership, then agitations for more states will be weakened.
Revenue allocation has been a tool in the hands of the elites especially at the central government to satisfy their un-quenching appetite for money. There has always been the struggle on what percentage goes to where, but it is important to ask for public accountability in the use of this public funds. It is our position that an adequate revenue allocation formula be put in place but at the same time, the political-elite should account for the present percentage they receive and stop using this revenue allocation problem to overheat the polity. We contend that the issue of accountability is primary to that of revenue allocation.
Power sharing has been an endemic issue militating against the consolidation of Nigeria federalism. The region or zone from which the occupant of a particular public office originated from has become more important than the credentials and quality of the leader. The power-elites have emphasized this regional basis of power sharing to ensure their access to power especially at the centre. It is important to note that consolidation will be impossible until we emphasize those qualities that unite us and not those that divide us.
Our point of argument in this paper is the acknowledgement that there are a lot of issues that has and is endangering the consolidation of the Nigerian federalism but the common denomination is power-elite factor. The elites have continually magnified problems inherent in the Nigeria federalism to their own advantage and the disadvantage of the consolidation process.
According to Chinua Achebe, the trouble with Nigeria is the failure of leadership. Leadership is a critical factor in nation-building and it should be understood in two important but related ways. Firstly, there are the personal qualities of integrity, honesty, commitment, and competence of individual leaders at the top. Secondly, there are the collective qualities of common vision, focus, and desire for development of the elites as a whole. Leadership is not everything but it is an extremely important factor (Gambari, 2008). In summary, we submit that consolidating Nigerian federalism is possible with a combine effort of the elites and the masses.





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