ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY AND EGYPTIAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY AND EGYPTIAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY

PRESENTED BY

WISDOM IYEKEKPOLO

BEING A SEMINAR PAPER PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF BENIN, BENIN CITY, NIGERIA

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE COURSE REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

COURSE LECTURER
DR. M.I.M. ABUTUDU

APRIL, 2011









ABSTRACT

The history of humans has been that of interaction. This interaction has grown from intra-state to inter-state. Interaction can be studied and the determinant of state actions described. This paper focuses on the interaction between Israel and Egypt. It reviews the history of this interaction, the present Political instability in Egypt, the response of Israel to this Egyptian Political instability and an attempt is made at analyzing Israel’s stand and the determinant of this position using the realist approach to Foreign Policy Analysis.




















INTRODUCTION

For almost half of its existence as a State, of all its neighbours, Israel has enjoyed its most cordial relations with Egypt, particularly under the presidency of Hosni Mubarak. Egypt occupies a strategic position in the Middle East, with control of the Suez Canal, the main maritime thoroughfare for trade between East and West. Throughout its recent history Egypt has been at the Political and Cultural forefront of pan-Arabism. With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Egypt took a lead role in the struggle for Palestinian rights in the land occupied by the new state. From 1948 to 1973 Egypt was a key participant in the wars that broke out between Israel and its neighbours (www.memonitor.org.uk 2011:1).

In 1967, Israel instigated a war by destroying the entire Egyptian Airforce on the ground in a “pre-emptive” strike. With war between Israel and Egypt-Jordan-Syria broke out, Israel occupied Sinai and the Gaza strip (as well as the West Bank and Syrian Golan Heights). Gaza had been administered by Egypt since 1948. The Israel defense forces took control of the whole Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal (Six Day War) www.memonitor.org.uk 2011:2).

In 1973, Egypt and Syria launched an operation to claim back the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights but the UN passed resolution 339 calling for cease fire. The Egyptian government agreed to enter into peace negotiations with the Israelis and on the 26th of March 1979 the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in Washington, DC following the 1978 Camp David Accords and the Egyptian Presidents visit to Israel in 1977. The peace treaty was signed by Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israel Prime Minister Menachem Begin and witnessed by United States President Jimmy Carter (www.wikipedia.org Camp David Accords-Israeli Ministry of foreign Affairs). The main features of the 1979 Peace Treaty are as follows:
1. Mutual recognition of each country which made Egypt officially the first Arab country to recognize Israel.
2. Complete withdrawal of Israel troops from the Sinai Peninsula and the cessation of the state of war that had existed since the 1948 Arab-Israel war.
3. Egypt agreed to leave Sinai Peninsula demilitarized.
4. Free passage of Israel ships through the Suez Canal and recognition of the strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Agaba and the Taba-Rafah straits as international water ways.
5. The US was also to begin economic and military aid to Egypt and political backing for its governments (www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/egypt.htm).

According to the Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East, “The normalization of relations (between Israel and Egypt) went into effect in January 1980. Ambassadors were exchange in February. The boycott laws were repealed by Egypt’s National Assembly the same month and some trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for. In March 1980 regular Airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began supplying Israel
with crude oil” (www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PeaceProcess/GuidetothePeaceProcess/CampDavidAccords).

From the Camp David Peace Accords in 1978 until 2000, the United States has subsidized Egypt’s Armed forces with over $38 billion worth of aid. Egypt receives about $2 billion annually (www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/egypt.htm).


REALISM THEORY IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

The realism approach is a normative approach to the study of international relations. Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger are famous realists.
The fundamental basis of political realism is the concept of “interest defined in terms of power” it assumes that, in the formulation of foreign policy, what matters is the interest of the nation. The idea of interest is of the essence in politics and it is forever there through time and place (Ejiofor, 1981). Sultan Khan argues that realism seeks to preserve political autonomy and territorial integrity of nation states. Once basic interests are secured, national interest may take different forms. Some states may have an interest in securing more resources or land; other states may wish to expand their own political or economic systems into other areas. Generally speaking, national interest must be defined in terms of power (www.homepages.stmartin.edu/Fac_Staff/rlangill/PLS%20300/Competing%20World%20Views-Lamborn.htm).
C. Alden argues that Foreign Policy Analysis starting point is the state and its interactions with other states, be this through direct bilateral relations or through multilateral institutions such as the United Nation. In keeping with the realist paradigm, Foreign Policy Analysis understands the state to be a unitary actor in order to assess a state’s foreign policy. In this context, a key concept in Foreign Policy Analysis is that of the ‘national interest’ (Alden, 2006). Hans J. Morgenthau in his analysis of realism put forth six principles:
1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. He posits that to give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline. In order words we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain circumstances and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must solve his problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he act in a rational manner). Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can analysis what their objectives might have been (Morgenthau, 2006:4).
2. Morgenthau posited that statesman “think and act in terms of interest defined as power and that historical evidence proves this assumption (Morgenthau, 2006). This concept, central to Morgenthau’s realism, gives continuity and unity to the seemingly diverse foreign policies of the widely separated nation-states (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990). In Morgenthau’s views the concept of national interest presupposes neither a naturally harmonious, peaceful world nor the inevitability of war as a consequence of the pursuit by all nations of their national interests. Quite to the contrary, it assumes continuous adjustment of conflicting interest by diplomatic action (Morgenthau, 1952). This assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman –past, present or future– has taken or will take on the political scene (Morgenthau, 2006:5).
3. Realism assumes that it’s key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category that is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all (Morgenthau, 2006:10). However, in a world in which sovereign nations via for power, the foreign policies of all nations must consider survival the minimum goal of foreign policy. All nations are compelled to protect “their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations”. Thus, national interest is identified with national survival. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990).
4. Realism maintain that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the action of states in their abstract universal formulation but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. Morgenthau argues that morality in the pursuit of national interest differs from that of individual relationship. Realism, then considers prudence –the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions- to be the supreme virtue of politics (Morgenthau, 2006:12).
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe (Morgenthau, 2006:12), when foreign policy analysis is done under the framework of national interest which is defined in terms of power, we are able to objectively explain different state actions and then pursue policies that respect the interests of other states while protecting our national interest (Morgenthau, 2006).
6. On the sixth principle, Morgenthau emphasizes the autonomy of the political sphere he argues that intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth, the lawyer of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist of the conformity of action with moral principles. He maintains that political actions should be judged by political criteria (Morgenthau 2006:13).


LIMITATIONS OF REALISM

Different theoretical approaches to the study of international relations have received criticism and Realism is no exception.

The concept of National interest as defined by realist has been criticized. They argue that National interest as a necessary criterion of policy is obvious and un-illuminating. No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or in disregard of the national interest (Cook and Moos, 1953:28). Moreover, it is difficult to give operational meaning to the concept of national interest. Statesmen are constrained or given freedom by many forces in interpreting the national interest. They are often the captives of their predecessors’ policies. They interpret national interest as a result of their cultural training, values and the data made available to them as decision-makers (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990:124).

Realism has also been criticized for placing too much emphasis on Power as the principal behaviour. They argue that the concept of power has not been clearly conceptualized. The measurement of power or the unit for the measurement of power has not been provided by realist writings; moreover, power must be related to the objective for which it is to be used. The amount and type of power vary with national goals. In addition, realists have been criticized for allegedly having placed too much emphasis on power, to the relative exclusion of other important variables (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990:126).

These criticisms not withstanding, realism has been the most important attempt at the study of power as a key variable in political behaviour. In Robert O. Keohane’s words “Realism provides a good starting point for the analysis of cooperation and discord “(Keohane, 1984:245). On this basis, I shall attempt to analyse Israel’s foreign policy in its relation to Egypt and her current political instability, Israel’s specific position as it affects Egypt, what is at stake and what Israel stands to gain or loss given specific scenario.


AN OVERVIEW OF THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS

In Egypt, discontent with life in the autocratic, police state has simmered under the surface for years. There has also been growing discontent over economic woes, poverty, unemployment, corruption and police abuses. Even with the long-standing Egyptian discontent, it appears the Tunisian experience was enough to push many young Egyptians into the street for the first time. Social media tools, such as Twitter and Facebook were used extensively to rally support for the protesters as instructions were sent out to people on why, when and where to gather via them.

On 25th January, 2011, demonstrators were gathered peacefully in central Cairo demanding an end to Mubarak’s nearly 30 years regime and the economic woes that has accompanied it. As the crowds filled Cairo’s Tahrir Square –waving Egyptian and Tunisian flags and adopting the same protest chants that have rung out in the streets of Tunis, the police blasted the crowds with water cannons and set upon them with batons and tear gas in an attempt to clear the demonstrators shouting “Down with Mubarak”. So the protest turned violent.

There were further demonstration in the preceding days in major cities likes Cairo, Alexandria and Suez. This resulted in lots of death estimated by the Human Right Watch as not less than 300 people with about 2,000 injured
(http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2011/01/29/f-fag-egypt-uprising.html).

Series of attempts were made by the Mubarak regime to stop the unrest but all to know avail. President Mubarak assured that he will not contest for another term of office, he sacked the Cabinet and appointed a new one and he also appointed a Vice President (Vanguard: Jan. 29, Feb. 1 & 2, 2011). He made appeals to the demonstrators through public broadcast on the public television but none of theses could pacify the demonstrators. He finally relinquished power to the Supreme Military Council 18 days after the demonstration started.


ISRAEL’S NATIONAL INTEREST AND EGYPTIAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Israel faces acute security predicaments spawned by the rapid changing political dynamics in the Middle East. Israel’s security predicaments would not have been all that acute had the political upheaval currently underway in the Arab world of the Greater Middle East had been localized to one or two of her Arab neighbours. Israel’s security environment becomes threatening and a matter of strategic concern as the political upheaval in the Arab world is today spreading far and wide like a ‘tsunami’. The situation becomes more startling for Israel as the mainstay of Israel’s security, its 32 year old Peace Treaty with Egypt authored and under written by the United State, today is shrouded in uncertainty with the overthrow of the pro-Israel regime of President Hosni Mubarak (www.eurasiareview.com).

Through out the 18 days protest in Egypt, the Israeli government remained relatively silent on the crisis except for Prime Minister Benjamin Natanyahu’s Press event with visiting German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Natanyahu said the demonstration Paralyzing Cairo and other major Egyptian cities weren’t instigated by the Muslim Brotherhood movement but that as one of the few organized opposition groups in the Arab country, the movement could “take advantage” of the situation to enhance its power. He further said he was monitoring events with “vigilance and worry” and feared radical Islamists could take advantage of any leadership vacuum (Williams, 2011).

The fear of the Brotherhood taking over the Egyptian government is not far fetched, given the statement credited to the current Brotherhood supreme leader, Mohamed Badi in 2010 “(We will) continue to raise the banner of jihad against the Jews, (our) first and foremost enemies….. Resistance is the only solution against the Zion-American arrogance and tyranny, and all we need is for the Arab and Muslim people to stand behind it and support it …… We say to our brothers the Mujahideen in Gaza; be patient, persist in (your Jihad), and know that Allah is with you”. (www.daphneanson.blogspot.com/2011/02/muslim-brotherhoods-Jihad-against-Jews.html). The Muslim Brotherhood movement is a deeply conservative Islamic movement, which wants to move Egypt from secularism to the rule of the Quran but was banned by the Egyptian government. Following the anti-government protests in Egypt the movement was re-energized. In an interview with NHK TV, Rashad Al-Bayoumi -the Deputy leader of the movement in Egypt said that there was a need to dissolve the peace treaty with Israel (http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/2668051/posts). The well organized group, though banned in Egypt has gained popularity in part for its opposition to President Hosni Mubarak’s three-decade rule. In 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood members –posing as independents- won 20 percent of seats in Egypt’s parliament (www.theisraelproject.org).

The issue of National Interest is of the greatest essence to the Israeli nation-state. This national interest includes her national security, territorial integrity, political autonomy and power. Adopting the realist model, a statesman is assumed to be rational in approaching the circumstance that threatens to ouster the pro-Israel government in Egypt. The foreign policy of Israel must consider national survival as its minimum goal, so therefore, Israel must seek to protect and sustain an Egyptian government that has maintained a peace treaty with her for three decade. There is also the likelihood that an ouster of the Mubarak government would bring in an Islamic fundamentalist government in the likes of the Muslim Brotherhood; it is only rational to support an arrangement that will maintain the status-quo.

Kevin Rosner, Senior fellow at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security in Washington DC told the Daily News that “it is the vast cache of unknowns that underscores the greatest Israeli concern”. The main problems for Israel is the fact that the region still sees Israel as an aggressive state, while most of these societies vying for change at home have actually not changed. The inability of observers to predict the future political make-up of the region’s regimes is a real concern to Israel (www.hurriyetdailynews.com). Israel is usually a country where politicians have an opinion on any topic, and vociferously so. But on the political crisis in Egypt, Israel’s leadership has been unusually silent. “We are closely monitoring the events, but we do not interfere in the internal affairs of a neighbouring state”, was the comment from the Israeli Foreign Ministry (www.spiegel.de). This position is very unlike that of the United States, presently the greatest Israeli ally who finally went on air to support change as advocated by the Egyptian protesters. The Israeli position was a clear support for the Mubarak regime not necessarily for the interest of Mubarak or Egypt but for the national interest of Israel in maintaining her power and her territory. This Israeli stand may be viewed as amoral being that it is ignoring the cries and aspirations of the Egyptian protesters for a more participatory, concerned and democratic government but realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the action of a state in abstraction but that morality must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. The weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions has guided the Israeli position.

In power struggles, nations follow policies designed to preserve the status quo, to achieve imperialistic expansion, or to gain prestige. In Morgenthau’s view, domestic and international politics can be reduced to one of three basic types: (1) to keep power, (2) to increase power, or (3) to demonstrate power. Although the purpose of a status quo policy is to preserve the existing distribution of power, the nation adopting such a policy does not necessarily act to prevent all international change; instead, status quo nations seek to thwart changes that may produce fundamental shifts in the international distribution of power (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990:97). Israel has sought to maintain the status quo in its silence and adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach.

True to the resilience of the Egyptian people, the government of Hosni Mubarak was overthrown and the Military is now in power and they are expected to guide the country to the type of constitutional and democratic changes the people had fought and died for. The pro-Israeli government led by Mubarak for about 3 decades has been overthrown against the hope of majority of the Israeli officials. Now the Israelis have to anticipated the worse and hope for the best.

The worse situation as anticipated by the Israelis is the enthronement of the Muslim Brotherhood via a democratic process. If the Brotherhood seizes power, experts and scholars have expressed different opinion at what will be their likely relationship with Israel. Some are of view that it will lead to an Iranian-style theocratic regime which would be a nightmare for Washington and Israel. That will mean a destruction of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and a teaming up of Egypt with other Arab nation against Israel. Bilal Hassen, a renowned Palestinian writer and political analyst writes that some experts who are of the view of a review of the peace treaty would want Egypt to handle this particular case in line with it own interest. The agreement signed with Israel stipulates that its articles may be reconsidered after every 15 years, and this date has passed twice without any form of view. There are numerous articles that could be reviewed. For example, the full sovereignty of the Sinai Peninsula should be transferred to Egypt, from a stage of (theoretical) acknowledgement, as it is currently, to a complete, tangible transfer. Egypt has a right to exist freely in Sinai, with regard to security, the army, the mobility of the people, construction work, and the cities and factories there. Some also believe that the Muslim Brotherhood will evaluate the Israel-Egypt relationship on the basis of Israel’s policy towards Arabs and the Palestinians in particular. Such a policy is characterized by aggression, a perpetual preparation for a state of war, and rejection of any serious moves towards political settlement (www.aawsat.com). On the other side of the argument are those that believe that the Muslim Brotherhood movement is less extreme than the hard-line clerics who rule Iran. Michael Singh, visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said that first and foremost, there is no figure in the Muslim Brotherhood who is equivalent to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Shiite cleric who led the toppling of the Iranian government (Sterling, 2011). There is an assumption that the Brotherhood will adhere to the Peace Agreement signed with Israel, due to the fact that it is an international convention, and because the decision to shift from a state of peace to a state of war is not an easy one. Furthermore, America’s economic and military weight in Egypt promotes the necessity to maintain existing relations with Israel. Dr Lieberman is of the view that the days of challenging Israel to rebuild pan-Arab credentials are over…. In the peace treaty, Egypt got back the Sinai. So there will be no incentive to fight Israel. He argues that a full break with Israel would not help Egypt that is the second largest recipient of U.S aid -after the Jewish state- Cairo picks up $1.3 billion annually in U.S military assistance and $815 million in economic aid. Lorenzo Piras argues that if there is war between Egypt and Israel, Egypt is likely to lose the war based partly on the following reasons.
1. Arab allies may not be easy as there is hardly any Arab unity as it was 3 decades ago.
2. Israel has defeated Egypt for 4 times. This is very important for the fighting spirit of soldiers.
3. The training level of the Tsahal military specialists in Israel is mush higher than in Egypt (www.profi-forex.us).

Israel has remained relatively silent even in all these debates. The pursuit of her national interest is the driver of this present silence. Israel watched helplessly as the pro-Israel government led by Mubarak was being overthrown and now Israel has continued to watch hoping that the next democratic election would not bring an anti-Israel government in Egypt. Even if this happens, Israel will always act in the protection of her national interest which holds territorial integrity, political autonomy/power, and national survival as basic.


CONCLUSION

In a world where sovereign nations vie for power, the foreign policies of all nations must consider survival the minimum goal of foreign policy. All nations are compelled to protect “their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations! Thus national interest is identified with national survival (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1990).

This paper has reviewed the Egypt-Israel relationship especially under the present political instability in Egypt; attempts have also been made to analyze possible scenarios and likely effect on the relationship. It is the view of this paper that the relative silent posture taken by Israel so far is in the protection of the Israeli national interest which has been analyzed to involve among others its national survival.

The continued existence and recognition of Israel as a sovereign state is an issue of basic interest to her and any type of government in Egypt that respects this territorial integrity will maintain a cordial relationship with Israel but on the contrary, a rusty relationship will exist and Israel will go ahead to protect her national interest even through military means.


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