Nigeria and Regional Economic Reconstruction

By

S. I. Ebohon

Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration

University of Benin, Benin City

E-mail: siebohon@yahoo.com

Neville Onebamhoi Obakhedo

Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration

University of Benin, Benin City

Abstract

Nigeria as a regional power to reckon with in Africa has the continent as the centre-piece

and cornerstone of its foreign policy objective. To this end, Nigeria within the West Africa

sub-region and in the region of Africa since independence has been very assertive in the

conduct of her foreign policy and pursuit of her national interest. This assertiveness exudes

through the frameworks of national interest; big-brother; economic diplomacy; and,

hegemonic stability. Thus, when you undertake a study of the political economy of

Nigerian foreign policy with a focus on economic diplomacy within the region, one is

overwhelmed by the irreducible role that Nigeria has played and is still playing in the

economic and political reconstruction of the region of Africa in general and the West

African sub-region in particular. To this end, this paper examines Nigeria’s role in the

economic reconstruction and transformation of the West African sub-region and the

African continent from independence, and the implications for the nation’s economic

diplomacy. It concludes by suggesting ways Nigeria can improve on this role without

neglecting its home front. The paper is expected to be illuminating to scholars, students as

well as policy-makers interested in understanding the role of Nigeria in regional economic

reconstruction.

Introduction

Nigeria’s contemporary role in sub-regional and continent-wide socio-economic, political and security

matters is well-articulated in the literature. Suffice it to say that, some few decades after independence,

scholarly analyses of Nigeria’s external relations have concentrated preponderantly on the conduct of

the country’s political and diplomatic relations with other states in the international system, with little

attention paid to the expanding cobweb of the country’s international economic transactions. Then

existing literature on the country’s external relations quite naturally reflected this sectoral partiality and

pre-occupation (Akindele & Ate, 1988). Bearing in mind the unquestionable centrality of the issue of

economic growth and development on the public-policy agenda of any nation and particularly on the

agenda of any country’s external relations, the need to redress this imbalance of research preoccupation

and therefore focus scholarly attention appropriately on this aspect of Nigeria’s external

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relations has become compelling for some decades now. This is responsible for the current availability

of stupendous materials chronicling Nigeria’s role not only in regional economic and security matters,

but in world affairs generally.

Nigeria is the tenth largest state of the continent, with a landmass of 924,000 square kilometres,

and 853 km long coastline (Bach 2007:301). Nigeria's population, officially estimated at 141 million in

2006, makes it the most populous country in Africa. In West Africa, an estimated 60% of the

population and over 50% of West Africa's potential for industrial and manufactured production are

located in Nigeria. Nigeria is also the region's largest economy, representing 55% of West Africa's

Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the continent's first and largest oil producer and the second most

important military power in sub-Saharan Africa, with an army of about 70,000 (Shoup 2007; Bach

2007). It is estimated that Nigeria earned nearly US$200 billion between 1970-1990 from crude oil

(Thomas and Sudharshan 2002:4). According to the latest estimate in 2009, the revenues generated by

the oil industry for Nigeria since 1958stood at over US$400 billion (Bach 2007:313). Such a

combination of human and natural resources endowments, dominance over neighbouring states and the

diplomatic or military engagement of successive regimes in the affairs of the continent account for the

country's perception as a regional power and a 'natural' leader in African continental affairs (Bach

2007:301). This heavyweight status puts Nigeria in a natural leadership role, one that both its

democratically-elected and military leaders have embraced since gaining independence from Britain in

1960.

Nigeria’s well-informed and well-established role in meeting the challenge of the task of being

at the forefront of Africa’s economic development dates back to the 1970s Akindele & Ate, (1988).

The size of the country, and its population and resources at independence made many African states to

see Nigeria as their beacon of hope. To this end, different positive epithets and messianic appellations

were used to describe Nigeria’s benevolent role in African affairs – “Giant of Africa”; “Big Brother”;

“Africa’s Godfather”; “Africa’s Father Christmas” or “Santa Claus”; and “Africa’s Regional

Messiah”. At independence, the country’s pre-eminent position was unquestioned and, on the

international scene, Nigeria wielded enormous political and diplomatic clout with a lot of heft (Banjo

1996). Bach (2007) therefore came to this conclusion: “ever since independence, messianic references

to a natural Nigerian leadership in the affairs of the African continent have been ingrained in the

conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy”. To this end, analysts in African government and politics based;

on the nation’s abundant human and natural resources, especially its foreign exchange earnings from

crude oil exports and other economic indicators, concluded that Nigeria was on its way to becoming

Africa’s first superpower in global affairs (Banjo 1996).

In the light of the above, Nigeria took it upon herself to set the pace for other African nationstates

to follow. Nigeria beckoned on other African states to join the band-wagon of good governance,

lay a solid foundation for socio-economic reconstruction and transformation, and embark on social

welfare programmes that would make the region of Africa a global delight. It is important to note that

by the mid-1980s, then Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, even launched a

much-publicized bid to achieve (for Nigeria) what he termed as a 'middle power' status in world affairs

(Bach 2007:303). On the ground of Nigeria's newly acquired oil wealth and influence, he and other

Nigerian policy makers started calling for a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ that would spare West Africa from

external (then mostly French) military interventions and promote, as an alternative, the concept of pax

Africana, namely the idea of conflict resolution among Africans and through African solutions (Bach

2007:303).

An intellectual voyage into a systematic exploration and analysis of this role is necessary for

understanding regional and internal constraints on Nigeria as well as opportunities for its foreign and

domestic economic policies. For the purpose of comprehensibility, this chapter is discussed in five

different sections. Section one discusses the conceptual and theoretical basis of the discourse. Section

two examines the contending perspectives on Nigeria’s role in regional activities. In section three,

understanding Nigeria’s role in sub-regional economic reconstruction is discussed. Nigeria’s role in

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African economic reconstruction is the subject matter of section four. The last section is concluding

remarks.

The Conceptual and Theoretical Basis of Economic Reconstruction in Africa

Economic reconstruction like many other concepts in the Social Sciences is a victim of definitional

pluralism. To those who subscribe to the Marxian or Neo-marxian school of thought for instance,

economic reconstruction is synonymous with economic democracy bereft of bourgeois manipulations.

Yet, to scholars who subscribe to the dominant-liberal school of thought, the concept is an attempt to

chisel out the unstructured economic structures that constitute a clog in the socio-economic wheel of

progress of a community, society or nation-state. However, there are others who see economic

reconstruction simply from the perspective of economic growth, transformation, modernization and

development. As a point of departure, we need to situate the phenomenon at hand in proper

perspective.

Several attempts have been made by scholars to explain away the concept of economic

reconstruction. These scholars tended to be divided into generations based on the period that their

postulation gained ascendancy. Four of such generation of writers can be delineated in the literature.

The first generation of economic re-constructionists included Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey

(Veblen influenced the work of Seymour Melman and Dewey the work of Paul Goodman). The second

generation included Lewis Mumford (Luccarelli 1995); while the third generation included Seymour

Melman, Percival Goodman and Paul Goodman (Feldman, 2007;Goodman and Goodman 1960). The

generation in currency is the fourth generation of re-constructionists. It include key scholars such as

Barry Commoner, Gar Alperovitz and Marcus Raskin (Alperovitz 2005; Raskin 1986) Stanley

Aronowitz, Noam Chomsky, John Kenneth Galbraith Key, and Simone Weil. Stanley Aronowitz’s

writings about social movements, the state, universities and culture, informs the critique of

contemporary society found in the work of economic re-constructionists. While Noam Chomsky wrote

about anarchist cooperatives and democracy, John Kenneth Galbraith wrote on the economy and

economists, and their economic reconstruction implications. Another important figure is Simone Weil

whose writings about problems or limits attached to militarism, social science atomization, Marxism,

the economy and political parties all resonate with an economic reconstruction agenda.

Succinctly put, economic reconstruction refers to a deliberate, conscious and systematic process

for creating a proactive vision of economic change and transformation. The basic idea is that problems

in the economy such as deindustrialization, environmental decay, outsourcing, industrial incompetence,

poverty and addiction to a permanent war economy are based on the design and organization of

economic institutions (Melman 2001). Economic reconstruction builds on the ideas of various

institutional economists and thinkers whose work both critique existing economic institutions and

suggests modes of organizing society differently (Veblen 1998).

The imperativeness of reconstruction occurs as fundamental problems plague the contemporary

organization of the economy that makes the prevailing economic order to be in dire need of reforms or

outright paradigm shift. Economic reconstruction is the sure way out because it readily supports the

creation of new socio-economic institutions and the redesigning of old ones that are still compatible

with the new order (Feldman 2007, Feldman 2008). The basic idea is to create a new way to organize

the economy and society so that institutions would be responsive to the needs of the citizenry. To this

end, proponents and staunch adherents of economic reconstruction advocate fundamental change

related to key socio-economic problems by placing high premium on the idea of alternative plans and

alternative organization (Feldman 2007; Feldman 2008). For example, according to Feldman (2007)

and Melman (2001), when economic reconstruction is brought to bear on a militarized society

(militarism), the key challenge for government is to support a demilitarized society through economic

conversion, disarmament, alternative security, military budget reductions and related social innovations

that would better the lot of the society. In the same vein, if it is a society ravaged with unemployment

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and depressed living standards, a key challenge for economic reconstruction is to promote economic

democracy, through concrete institutions and actions such as co-operatives, workers participation and

control, employee ownership plans, socially-responsible firms, community procurement, and various

initiatives to organize the economy on a decentralized basis with a view to putting it on the right track,

and on a sound footing for the benefit of the citizenry (Alperovitz 2005; Melman 2001). As it is with a

society, so it is with a nation-state or region mutatis mutandis.

However, the region of Africa with several sub-regions is confronted with an avalanche of

problems such as de-industrialization, environmental decay, outsourcing, industrial incompetence,

poverty, economic instability, corruption, violence, and authoritarianism, failed central planning, high

levels of illiteracy, lack of access to foreign capital, and frequent tribal and military conflict (ranging

from guerrilla warfare to genocide) which have dire consequences on the continent’s economy (Levy

2004:14). This makes deliberate economic reconstruction imperative and compelling for African

economies and Nigeria’s irreducible role in changing the climate cannot be under-estimated. To this

end, successive Nigerian governments have been at the vanguard of leading the continent out of the

woods by helping to put Africa on its right path to sustainable economic reconstruction and

development. It is germane to add that Nigerian government policies and programmes in solving both

its domestic, sub-regional and regional economic problems resonate with an economic reconstruction

agenda. This is a kind of deconstruction. This economic revival approach is tantamount to

deconstructing the character of the economy with a view to reconstructing it - a way of creating new

relevant and enduring institutions and redesigning and discarding old ones in attempts to organize the

economy and society to enable institutions work for the benefits of the citizenry. This was how a

former Nigerian military leader captured the imperativeness of this rejuvenating exercise: “We, of this

generation of leaders have a sacred duty to ensure that the economic and social ills plaguing Africa

are cured during this century” (Babangida 1991). This is consequent upon the realization of the fact

that economic reconstruction of the society is the cornerstone for economic revival, survival, security,

prosperity, power and prestige (Chinweizu 2005).

Nigeria’s Role in Regional Activities: Contending Perspectives

The structure and operation of the international economic system makes regionalism a central theme in

inter-states relations. To this end, the trend towards regionalism and regional arrangements has become

one of the most interesting developments in contemporary international relations. The Charter of the

United Nations specifically recognized it, and the Vandenberg Resolution, adopted by the United

States’ Senate on June 11, 1948, gave it strong endorsement (Palmer and Perkins, 2007:558). In this

regard, Nigeria’s support for regional co-operation, integration and transformation is unequivocal. The

country is noted for spear-heading military peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building

operations (regional security), regional economic diplomacy (integration), and peace building at the

vanguard of promoting political stability.

However, a scholarly analysis of the economic relations between Nigeria and her African

counter-parts should begin with clarification of the analytic paradigm and perspectives for examining

and understanding such relations. This framework should address not only the trends in, and dynamics

of the international economic system, particularly since the end of the Cold War, but also the domestic

structure and economic resource base of Nigeria’s external behaviour (Akindele & Ate). Analyzing the

role Nigeria is playing in regional economic reconstruction is exceedingly complex and contentious.

To this end, Nigeria’s role in the socio-political and economic construction and reconstruction of

Africa has tended to balkanize scholars into highly contentious camps. There are those who vigorously

contend that Nigeria’s role at both the sub-regional and continental levels is irrational, unwarranted and

senseless considering the mammoth and myriad domestic problems that the country itself had to

grapple with (Idisi and Idise 1996:169). In the same vein, there are those who vehemently support

Nigeria’s involvement in regional affairs. These perspectives include: National Interest school; the

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Prestige School; the Economic Diplomacy; School, the Big-Brother school, and the Hegemonic

Stability School.

Examining the big-brother role for example, analysts are of the opinion that it was a deliberate

new direction in Nigeria’s Africa policy under the Babangida administration. International relations

experts and pundits contend that Babangida single-handedly created a scenario in which he positioned

Nigeria to play the “altruistic big brother role” in the sub-region (Agedah, 1993:145). According to

Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, (Nigeria’s Finance and later Foreign Affairs Minister in the last lap of the

second term of Obasanjo civilian administration):

When there are crises, the countries have looked upon Nigeria to be an arbitrator. If you are

the older brother, the stronger brother or sister, you have to help those who come after you. It is

engrained in our cultural approach to the pursuit of our foreign policy objective.

The Prestige School of thought contends that as a leader or power to reckon with in Africa, it

behoves Nigeria to play a leading and exemplary role in promoting peace and in leading the path to

economic prosperity in the region of Africa. Ipso facto, playing such a noble role in the economic

construction and reconstruction of the region presents Nigeria with an opportunity to assert her

dominant position in the region as a matter of prestige. Analysts argue that if Nigeria fails to do so,

other credible and contending regional challengers such as Ghana, Egypt, Cote d’ Ivoire (formerly

Ivory Coast) and South Africa would take on such responsibilities (Idisi & Idise 1996:171).

Looking at Nigeria’s role from the perspective of economic diplomacy, the reason for the

nation’s decision to play the leading role of helping to stop the wars in the sub-region and beyond, and

being at the forefront of regional economic integration and transformation is because of the

leadership’s realization that the prevailing atmosphere of war and instability would make economic

growth and progress remain in the domain of a dream. This brings to the fore the nexus between

politics and economics in inter-state’ relations.

One other theory that has often been used to analyse and justify Nigeria’s role in sub-regional

and regional activities is ‘the theory of hegemonic stability’ by Keohane (1980) and Kindleberger

(1981). According to Keohane, the hegemon champions the cause of cooperation and integration by

pulling the less-willing and the less-able countries along, as it may not be possible for all countries to

move at the same time and pace (Rugumamu 2004:9).. The hegemonic leader’s economic strength and

political stability, for example, would bolster the region’s economic vitality and political stability

which strengthens regional economic integration. Thus, the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS and the

African Union’s political and economic activities are excellent contemporary examples of hegemonic

stability. The presence of a regional core or nucleus has the capacity to serve as a positive force for

developing and nurturing a viable economic cooperation arrangement, as well as for building a regional

peace and security system (Rugumamu 2004:10). It is important to note that Nigeria has also assumed

a disproportionate cost-burden for Africa’s integration projects and has to aid poor member-states

through the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF), a subsidiary of the Africa Development Bank Group of

Companies (AFDB).

Even though a common current runs through these prisms, to say the least, other countries have

come to realize and accept Nigeria’s benign hegemony and put sufficient effort into regionalization

activities to gradually increase their own power and influence. All of these still fall within the purview

of Nigeria’s national interest codified into the nation’s foreign policy objective. What is needed

therefore, is a careful synthesis of the most germane aspects of these contentions into a much broader

framework that can capture the dynamic characteristics of international relations at large, and also the

complicated nature of African politics that makes Nigeria’s intervention and consistent involvement in

its socio-economic and political development compelling and inevitable (Idisi and Idise op.cit).

Understanding African Economy and the Imperativeness of Nigeria’s Role in its Reconstruction

Debate on the causes of Africa’s economic backwardness has often been highly emotionally-charged;

participants have seldom attempted to present a balanced approach. Against the argument that Africa’s

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economic backwardness was a result of some character deficiency on the part of its inhabitants or of

economic mismanagement by governments, the underdevelopment approach places the blame

primarily on factors external to Africa (Naomi Chazan et al 1999:228-229). Thus, many writers on

Africa since the 1970s have borrowed from the underdevelopment literature, which had its origins in

the writings of the US economist, Paul Baran and which came to be used widely in the late 1960s by

some specialists on Latin America.

Since colonialism, African states have frequently been hampered by instability, corruption,

violence, and authoritarianism. Cold War conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, as

well as the policies of the Brettonwoods Institutions, also played a role in the instability. Although it

has abundant natural resources, Africa remains the world's poorest and most underdeveloped continent,

due to a variety of causes that may include the spread of deadly diseases and viruses (notably

HIV/AIDS and malaria), corrupt governments that have often committed serious human rights

violations, failed central planning, high levels of illiteracy, lack of access to foreign capital, and

frequent tribal and military conflict - ranging from guerrilla warfare to genocide (Levy 2004:14).

Poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition and inadequate water supply and sanitation, as well as poor health,

affect a large proportion of the people who reside in the African continent. Some of it is attributed to

unsuccessful economic liberalization programs spearheaded by foreign companies and governments,

but other studies and reports have cited bad domestic government policies more than external factors.

Suffice it to say that when African countries received their independence, most had economies

that were closely tied to those of their former colonial power. African governments were severely

constrained in the viable policy choices available to them. As late comers to industrial production,

African exporters were often faced with markets that have been saturated by more advanced

developing countries and confront consequent protectionist tendencies toward their exports on the part

of industrialized countries. Heavily dependent on international finance for their capital formation,

African countries have frequently been subject to pressure by international agencies to modify their

preferred development paths (Naomi Chazan)

According to Adedeji (2002), after independence, African governments, one after the other, had

embarked on industrialization as a major policy in the 1950s and 1960s. He contends that this policy

was carried too far by the Africans especially in the regime of structural adjustments leading to the deindustrialization

of Africa – a massive process of de-industrialization. The liberalization imposed by

structural adjustment opened the African market to goods coming from the highly-industrialized

countries, which no African country could ever compete with. With the economic crises of recent

decades and the liberalization policies of structural adjustment, the capacities of African governments

to cope with the vagaries of the international economic system appeared to have eroded.

Increasing recourse to structural adjustment programmes in the mid 1980s and the subsequent

erosion of tariff and monetary disparities across boundary-lines ushered a new cycle in the spread and

global expansion of trans-state flows of transactions The globalization of the world economies and the

reduction of opportunities offered by Africa's intra-continental borders, acted as an incentive for the

insertion of trans-state networks into activities associated with the management of Africa's external

frontiers and its transformation into a global interface. Throughout the African continent, the

contraction of cross-border discrepancies meant a reduction of opportunities for the growth of transstate

flows. Trans-state networks had to adjust to the diminishing opportunities generated by intra-

African frontier disparities, through the mobilization of new resources, drawn from the global

economy. The globalization of the world economies and the reduction of opportunities offered by

Africa's intra-continental borders, acted as an incentive for the insertion of trans-state networks into

activities associated with the management of Africa's external frontiers and its transformation into a

global interface.

From the above, it is only proper to say that the economic problems of the African continent

resemble a combination of negative tendencies, multiplying the region’s inability to autonomously

cope with the priorities of its development and modernization in a globalised world (see www.instituteEuropean

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for-afghan-studies.org). The region represents a reality of amorphous, isolated and poorly organized

economies. The above scenario paints a glowing picture of a deconstructed African economy

contingent on existential internal and external forces that is yearning for a reconstruction. This reality

is a consequence of decades of colonialism, the ethno-religious conflicts and inter-communal wars that

many African states have to contend with after political independence. The above views about the

African economy captures the truth of the experiences of the African people even in a globalized

world. This shocking situation has led to questions and posers as to what the way forward for Africa is.

As Bade Onimode (1992:153) poignantly put it over two decades ago:

the unfolding mega-trends of the world system have transformed

African cooperation from a regional necessity into a continental

imperative – the urgent strategic basis for the corporate survival

of the African economy

In this light, Rugumamu (2004:1) contends that:

If developed and large economies like those of the

United States, Germany and Japan find it important

to engage in regional integration and collective security

arrangements, then the case for Africa’s underdeveloped,

mini-economies must be compelling indeed. They are too

fragmented and too vulnerable to be economically viable.

He argues further that:

The emergence and development of regionalism on a global scale clearly indicates that

individual states outside the major economic and security blocs will find themselves slowly but

inexorably cast aside. If Europe needs economic and political integration for strength and prosperity,

Africa needs it for survival. Only through integration can the continent collectively and effectively

respond to the multifaceted challenges posed by the processes of globalization.

Along with South Africa, Nigeria is a focal point of American foreign policy in sub-Saharan

Africa. Moreover, its economic potential goes hand-in-hand with its population weight. Its GDP of

roughly $30 billion is equivalent to more than half of the GDP of the West African region as a whole.

Its industrial and military sectors are by far the largest and the most diversified (Shoup 2007). From the

foregoing, we cannot meaningfully conceptualize the status of Africa’s economy and the role of

Nigeria in its reconstruction unless we understand the dynamics, pressures and constraints that have

combined to consign Africa to the periphery of the world economic order (Babatope 1998).

Scholars in African government and politics agree that the economic and resource dominance

of Nigeria is important in understanding the political economy of the continent. To this end, the role of

Nigeria can neither be underplayed nor be ignored if one is to understand regionalization processes,

and economic reconstruction efforts in West Africa in particular, and Africa in general.

Nigeria’s Role in Sub-Regional Economic Reconstruction

Nigeria's cross-border interactions with its West African neighbours dates back to the colonial period,

but they entered a new phase during the early 1970s. Many of the countries in the sub-region that were

not oil producers, excluding Nigeria had serious problems of external balance. Nigeria's fast expanding

oil production and, after 1973, the sudden increase in revenues stimulated the intensification of cross

border trade activities (Soludo 2006). Consequent upon the global oil price shock of 1973, many West

African States were already in the throes of economic difficulties (Babangida 1991). This locked the

economies of West African states, notably those of Togo, Benin, Niger, Chad and Western Cameroon,

into quasi-organic relationships with Nigeria. To this end, these countries generally sought a

fundamental change in the structure of production and trade and have sought to fashion a regional trade

mechanism to help orient their economies towards regional specialization through dynamic effects of

customs union, economies of scale, and import-substitution industrialization (Mikesell 1968;

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Babangida 1991:5-6). This was a conscious and deliberate voyage to economic reconstruction

individually, and collectively, as a panacea to the somewhat deconstruction of their economies due to

colonial rule, and the vagaries of the international economic system.

However, trans-state trade interactions between Nigeria and its neighbours had nothing to do

with trade liberalization programmes, nor with any weakening of tariff barriers. But cross-border

integration were actually stimulated by the very persistence of significant tariff, normative, fiscal and

monetary disparities that generated much valued sources of opportunity for local and regional players.

In the same vein, it is important to stress that it was Biafra's secession attempt (1967-70) that initially

prompted Nigeria to launch regional initiatives designed to counter French, and Ivorian support to the

rebels, circumvent international sanctions on arms deliveries and more generally counter the effects of

international mobilization in favour of Biafra's independence (Bach 2007). Once the war was over,

Nigeria's diplomatic initiatives towards the establishment of the 15 member-state Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) played a decisive and pivotal role. Nigeria's

diplomatic activism was then largely stimulated by geo-political considerations, namely the perceived

need to increase Nigeria's standing and influence among francophone West African states.

The broad objective of ECOWAS is the promotion of co-operation and development in all

fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy,

agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural

matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its people, increasing and managing

economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members and contribution to the progress and

development of the African continent through the integration of their economies (Akinyemi, Falegan &

Aluko 1983:). At its formation, the ECOWAS held a lot of promises as one of the dynamic strategies

through which economic underdevelopment could be surmounted and all-pervading poverty in the subregion

eliminated (Babangida 1991). The existence of ECOWAS essentially underscores the reality

that regional economic integration has become a necessary complementary strategy to national

economic development policies (Babangida 1991).

General Gowon (Nigerian military leader between 1966 and 1975) multiplied bilateral contacts,

including in conjunction with financial stakes in joint industrial projects. He also established solid

credentials as a regional leader when, after reversing Nigeria's initial hostility to the opening of

negotiations towards the future EU-ACP Lome Convention, he took the lead in the negotiations (Bach

1983: 605-623; Bach 2007:304). Comforted by its oil resources and a favourable international

environment, Nigeria attracted key trade and aid concessions from the Europeans. Within a few weeks

after the signing of the Lome Convention, the Charter establishing ECOWAS was also signed in Lagos

amidst much enthusiasm. This momentum was quickly lost when, following Gowon's overthrow in

July 1975, General Muritala Mohammed's abrasive regional and continental diplomacy revived

francophone fears of the Nigerian 'bully' or what was perceived as pax Nigeriana (Fawole 2003;

Gambari 1978).

Aside from the fact that Nigeria is a founding member state of ECOWAS, the nation has

continued to be a moving force within it: providing responsible leadership; being a major financial

contributor; initiating the adoption of a common currency; being a motivator and major actor in fasttracking

processes; hosting the Secretariat, Parliament and Court of Jurist. Nigeria regarded ECOWAS

as the beacon of hope for all the people in the sub-region, a veritable institutional framework for

bringing development to all the economies thereby improving the vitality and quality of the lives of its

people. Babangida (1991:95) pointed out that this can only be achieved through bold and sustained

efforts of the present leaders, especially commitment to the organization’s principles of collective self

reliance, solidarity and economic regionalism and integration.

Despite dwindling economic fortunes of Nigeria, coupled with corruption by government

officials in the 1980s and beyond, the unflinching commitment of Nigeria to the aims, objectives and

aspirations of the ECOWAS has never been in doubt. During the administration of General Babangida,

Nigeria fulfilled her promise to provide residential accommodation to some senior staff of the

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ECOWAS outside its statutory obligation (Babangida 1991:42). In the same period, Nigeria also gave

thirty-four (34) housing units to the body, while the government expended the sum of N5million

(equivalent to about US$4.5 million) to augment the amount of money approved by the authority for

the implementation of the project for the construction of ECOWAS Headquarters.

In the 1990s also, there was a reduction in the flow of financial resources including Official

Development Assistance (ODA) to the sub-region which had a devastating effect on the sub-region’s

ability to mobilize adequate resources to finance their economic recovery programme by themselves

(Babangida 1991:52). To this end, Nigeria came to the rescue by spearheading the ECOWAS

Economic Recovery Programme which sets out measures that were to be taken at national and

community levels to deal with the enormous task of economic recovery and socio-economic

transformation of the sub-region (Babangida 1991:51).

In terms of regional security, Nigeria has played an unparalleled role in finding solutions to

internal conflicts in countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone (Rugumamu, 2004:11). Through

Nigeria’s determined and thoughtful efforts, there was a paradigm shift from the trade-based

foundation of ECOWAS to a security-based Economic Community of West African States Monitoring

Group (ECOMOG), established to unite the region's armies to contain the debilitating civil war that

erupted in Liberia in the early 1990s. The establishment of ECOMOG was spearheaded by Nigeria. It

was at the 13th Summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held in

Banjul, the Gambia’s capital (August 6-7, 1990) that then Nigerian military leader, President Ibrahim

Badamasi Babangida proposed to ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, the need for setting up of

a Mediation Committee comprising five member-states, that would handle and resolve the everincreasing

political conflicts in the sub-region especially in view of the fratricidal and genocidal civil

war that was going on in Liberia (Agedah 1993:147). Babangida stated inter-alia at the Summit:

It is imperative for us in this region to grasp and adapt to

the dynamics of this global process of change if we are

to contribute to and benefit from it. This would, therefore

entail an expansion of the purview of the assignment we

gave to the Secretariat (of ECOWAS)… The generally unstable

situation in member states and other political problems of

this continent indicate that our organization has a

responsibility to act and act urgently and decisively (Agedah 1993:147)

Positioning his proposal on the global economic and political landscapes, he beckoned on

fellow West African leaders to search for a remedy to the most critical structural-functional defects of

ECOWAS and rethink the political and security environment in which economic development within

the sub-region will take place and as a result create a more conducive atmosphere for the conduct of

economic development (Agedah 1993:147). According to analysts, the initial decision of ECOWAS to

intervene in Liberia (1990-1997) occurred in a post-cold war world where US unwillingness to

intervene and restore order in Monrovia created what Nigeria and some West African leaders saw as a

window of opportunity for experimenting pax Africana on an ad-hoc basis (Gershoni 1993 21-43; Ellis

1999: 162). However, with the end of the Cold War and a gradual withdrawal of France from Africa,

Nigeria decisive hegemonic role in the region has become apparent (Rugumamu 2004:11).

From its conception to its fruition, Nigeria gave huge financial backing to ECOMOG, and

contributed large contingent of troops. From 1990 to 1997, Nigeria deployed over 12,000 troops to the

organization including commitment of other resources. As the war spilled over the border to Sierra

Leone, ECOMOG sent troops in 1998 to push back attacking rebels until United Nations forces arrived

(Shoup 2007). From the decision of ECOWAS to intervene in the Liberian war in 1990 unto the

temporary resolution of the conflict seven years later, Nigeria's diplomatic, financial and military

involvement shaped processes and outcomes in a decisive fashion (Ellis 1999; Adebajo 2002a;

Adebajo 2002b; Francis 2001). The event earned nonetheless valuable international kudos to the

Nigerian military dictatorship. Indeed, throughout the second Clinton administration, US concern at

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curbing the spread of conflicts in Africa was mitigated by weariness that this should not translate into

entangling commitments. This meant backing regional 'anchor' states that, (as Nigeria) were "willing to

take losses and sustain deployments" (Leatherwood 2001: 24). Once more, Abuja's military and

financial contribution dwarfed other states' to the extent that it could "brush aside ... continued

diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and pursued a military solution instead" (Berman and Sams

2003: 46).

The transformation of both Liberia and Sierra Leone into what they are today, are

unprecedented cases of post-conflict state reconstruction based on the massive inflow of international

aid and the laying of an egalitarian economic reconstruction foundation instigated by Nigeria (UN

2003; Fayemi 2004: 19). Suffice it to say that other Nigerian leaders after Babangida saw the need to

continue with the fundamental issue of regional security by maintaining troops not only in the two wartorn

countries in the sub-region but including Darfur in The Sudan, north-east of Africa.

Under the Olusegun Obasanjo civilian administration (1999 – 2007), Nigeria was still in the

front of helping to transform the objectives of ECOWAS to reality. According to Ihonvbere (2004):

Under the current administration, Nigeria’s foreign policy has undergone significant

refurbishing, reformation and transformation….At another level, the President’s stature, credibility,

power, influence, and understanding of the intricacies of foreign policy….this directly translates into

respect for Nigeria. Whether you consider Sierra Leone, Liberia, ECOWAS, NEPAD…Nigeria’s

achievement in Liberia is unprecedented. Without American funds or subsidy and with unprecedented

courage, Nigeria has brought peace to that country, stopped the killings and helped map out a new

path to recovery, reconciliation and reconstruction. The world has acknowledged this feat. And I was

present recently when President Blah of Liberia visited Nigeria to thank the President and the

Nigerian people and described President Obasanjo as the “Father of the Liberian nation.

The international clout and personality of Obasanjo have turned Nigeria into a key broker as

UN and AU engagement in the conflicts of the continent have spectacularly expanded across the

continent. Obasanjo's activism within the ECOWAS sub-region and Africa as a whole has done much

to boost international support for 'Pax Africana' - a term nowadays much valued in Europe and the US

where it correlates with such ideas as constructive disengagement and 'try Africa first’ exit solutions to

conflict management on the continent (Sesay 2006). In West Africa as elsewhere on the continent,

Nigeria has become a model and a mentor in efforts to combine multilateralism with conflict resolution

through arbitration and rule of (international) law.

The Economic Community of West Africa seems to have done relatively better than most

regional schemes precisely because Nigeria has been willing to shoulder a large compensatory burden

(McCarthy 1999:25; Rugumamu 2004). The reason for Nigeria’s decision to play the leading role of

helping to stop the wars in the sub-region and beyond was because of the leadership realization that the

prevailing atmosphere of war and instability would make economic growth and progress to remain a

mirage.

Nigeria and Economic Reconstruction in Africa

After acquiring independence, Nigeria immediately liaised with other independent African countries

like Ghana and Ethiopia to establish a ‘United Africa’ that would promote its solidarity, and would be

free from political domination, social deprivation, racial segregation, cultural bastardization, religious

lobotomization, and economic exploitation. This resulted in the formation of an Africa-wide body, the

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The OAU was changed to

The African Union (AU) in 2001 – a replica of the change of the European Community (EC) to the

European Union (EU). Despite this change in nomenclature, Nigeria’s role in its activities has not

diminished as an acknowledged member inside the AU powerhouse or think-tank.

The emergence of independent African states brought into focus the economic significance of

national boundaries which introduced discontinuities in trade, inflows of factors of production and in

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general economic policies (Akinyemi, Falegan & Aluko 1983: xv). There was also the awareness that

most of the African countries are too small to be able to create modern viable industrial structures

within their national frameworks (Akinyemi, Falegan & Aluko 1983: xxiv, xvi). The problem of

enhancing the rate of economic progress and combating poverty, ignorance and disease, which became

the major preoccupation of the African people, soon led to the realization that the individual efforts of

African countries could not sufficiently induce the rapid rates of development necessary to achieve this

noble objective (Akinyemi, Falegan & Aluko 1983: xv-xvi). It is now generally recognised that the

appropriate strategy for rapid economic development in developed countries is through regional

economic integration. Thus, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), in many of its resolutions

has urged all developing countries to continue their efforts to institute schemes for regional and subregional

integration or measures of trade expansion among themselves.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many African countries were already independent, albeit,

political independence as distinct from economic independence that was canvassed by Ghanaian

President, Kwame Nkrumah. Efforts by leaders to lay a solid foundation for freeing the continent from

the shackles of economic underdevelopment with which the African economy was manacled led to the

establishment of a regional development bank - The African Development Bank (ADB). The bank was

established in 1964 with the intention of promoting economic and social development in Africa, under

the auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa but began operation in 1966. The ADB Group

comprises of the African Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Fund (ADF), and the

Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF) (ADB Report 2009). The NTF was established in 1976 by the Nigerian

government with an initial capital of $80 million, with its current total resource base put at over $432

million; and it was lending at a 4% interest rate with a 25-year repayment period, including a five year

grace period (ADB Report 2009). The NTF is an eloquent testimony of the commitment of Nigeria to

laying the solid and strong economic reconstruction foundation for an integrated African society and

economy - to participate appropriately and responsibly in the preparation and implementation of

investment projects both at local and national levels which will also provide Africa with the vitally

important channels for transfer of valuable know-how, data, and technologies badly needed for the

self-sustained economic growth and development of the continent. It is important to note that Nigeria is

the only country in the continent to set up such a trust fund in the ADB Group for poorer countries to

borrow money with a view to putting their economies on the path of prosperity.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the African continent was held ransom by the IMF and World Bank

policies of structural adjustment and debt restructuring. The concomitant persistent economic crises

forced African states to launch Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) in July,

1985 with Nigeria at the fore front with many of its meetings held in her soil. The adoption of the

United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development

(UNPAAERD, 1986-1990) marked the climax of efforts to present Africa’s position to the

international community (Babangida 1991:50). But according to Babangida (1991:58, 93)

African economic recovery and long-term development, given the political and

economic fragmentation of the continent, will be impossible for Africa to realize its

vision of an African Economic Community without collective self-reliance, economic

co-operation and integration; and without drawing attention to the serious challenges

that lie ahead in the international economic environment in the 1990s and beyond

Nigeria was also a leading figure in the formulation and implementation of various economic

blueprints for Africa’s integration and development; namely: the Lagos Plan of Action; the Abuja

African Economic Community Treaty, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

The Abuja Treaty, signed in 1991 and came into effect on May 12, 1994, had the core objectives of

promoting economic, social, political, and cultural development, as well as the integration of African

economies, in order to increase economic self-reliance, self-sustaining development and political

stability (Rugumamu 2004:2). Indeed, for the first time in African history, the AEC Treaty not only

provides the legal, institutional, economic and political framework for economic cooperation and

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integration, but also stipulates a comprehensive list of principles to guide the conduct of member-states

(Rugumamu 2004:3). It also recognizes the sub-regional economic communities as the pillars of the

future continental community that would serve as the conduit pipe to restructure their organizations,

rationalize and harmonize policies, and coordinate joint programs in such a way that they are in

conformity with the objectives, principles and priorities of the AEC Treaty (Rugumamu 2004:5).

At the extraordinary summit of the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) in Sirte, Libya in

September 1999, African Heads of States took an historic decision to establish an African Union in

conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter of the OAU and the provisions of the treaty

establishing the African Economic Community. The objectives being: to promote democratic

principles; peace; security and stability; greater unity and solidarity between African countries and

African peoples; and, the acceleration of political and socio-economic integration.

At its 37th Ordinary Session in Lusaka, in July 2001, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and

Government adopted the New African Initiative (later renamed the New Partnership for Africa’s

Development (NEPAD) (Rugumamu 2004:2). Through NEPAD, a new kind of partnership is

envisaged with the North and various multilateral and multinational institutions. President Obasanjo of

Nigeria played an instrumental role in creating NEPAD by encouraging other African leaders to create

a continent-wide strategy for development. Both visions seek to reconfigure the continent’s political

and economic institutions in order to manage the forces of globalization and stop the continent from

sinking further into anarchy. This version of regional cooperation and integration would not only create

economic benefits for member countries, but would also serve as a credible instrument for enhancing

peace and security in the region by multiplying points of interaction among people and groups with

similar interests (Rugumamu 1997:283). This is the core of regional economic reconstruction.

Nigeria's willingness to wade into regional turmoil had made the country a power and a

political force across the continent (Shoup 2007). Focusing its foreign policy on African affairs,

Nigeria has deployed troops on peacekeeping missions to calm conflicts, sent diplomats to negotiate

political disputes and committed resources to organizations that promote development and economic

cooperation between African countries. Along with South Africa, the continent's other super - power,

Nigeria commands a broad influence within the AU. Many of the African Union's peacekeepers come

from Nigeria. The nation’s capital, Abuja had been the site of peace talks between the Sudanese

government and the rebel groups in Darfur. Nigerian forces are present in all of the United Nations

peacekeeping missions in Africa: Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of

the Congo and Western Sahara. In total, Nigeria commits 2,462 soldiers to U.N. missions across the

globe, according to the United Nations (Shoup 2007). Peacekeeping remains the cornerstone of

Nigeria's regional influence because Nigeria is aware that without political stability, there can be no

economic prosperity.

Conclusion

The philosophy of Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy is admirable, laudable and

romantic, because the nation’s involvement in the economic reconstruction of the sub-region and the

continent is real. However, while pursuing an African agenda, the domestic front had suffered both

socio-economic and political setbacks that had led to deep and enduring frustrations and

disenchantment among the populace about the Nigerian project.

In the present world situation, Nigeria needs to put its house in order by reconstructing the

nation-state and empowering the people socially, politically and economically. This is so much so that

the people serve as the conduit-pipe through which the country can build on the foundation of regional

economic reconstruction laid since independence; and as a project that require great determination and

thoughtfulness. This has to be done by putting the nation’s economy on the path of highest possible

rate of growth with its benefit distributed equitably among the Nigerian people which in turn, translates

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into securing for the region as a whole a long lasting process of economic transformation, growth and

development.

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European Journal of Social Sciences

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